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I.

INTRODUCTION

We are experiencing a new "Constitutional Revolution" 1 in the
judicial interpretation of state constitutions. The era of major state
constitutional innovation prior to the turn of the century2 was concerned primarily with changes in constitutional texts.' Similarly,
the wave of state constitutional revision taking place since about
1950 has dealt with revisions and modernization of constitutions
themselves.4 The rediscovery of state constitutional rights in the
past decade, however, involves judicial interpretation of state
constitutions.5

Although state constitutional interpretation always has been important in areas of civil litigation such as state taxation and eminent domain, and in areas of criminal procedure such as bail
rights, a broader spectrum of the private bar and a growing number of law professors now are discovering state constitutional law
for the first time. This is attributable directly to the many "evasion cases" of the past decade in which state supreme courts have
relied on their own constitutions to provide greater protections for
their citizens than are required by the United States Supreme
1. This may be contrasted with what Professor Howard refers to as the "so-called 'Constitutional Revolution' of the 1930's." Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the
Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 880 (1976). Professor Swindler asked whether
the 1970's would see state courts "make a massive intellectual reversal of poles analogous to
the reversal in federal constitutional law after 1937." Swindler, State Constitutionsfor the
20th Century, 50 NEB. L. Rv. 577, 596 (1971). We do not have the data to know generally,
but certainly massive change has occurred in the area of state constitutional protections of
individual liberties.
2. See generally Swindler, supra note 1, at 583-85.
3. Much of that movement and the legislative change accompanying it was frustrated by
the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 585-86.
4. See generally Adrian, Trends in State Constitutions, 5 Hv. J. ON LEGIS. 311 (1968);
Bebout, Recent Constitution Writing, 35 Tax. L. REv. 1071 (1957); Graves, State Constitutional Law: A Twenty-five Year Summary, 8 Wm. & MARY L. Rv. 1 (1966); Graves, Current Trends in State ConstitutionalRevision, 40 NEB. L. Rv. 560 (1961).
5. This "new" use of state constitutions has been detailed elsewhere. See Developments
in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 I-ARv. L. REy. 1324
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. See also Special Section, The Connecticut Constitution, 15 CONN. L. REV. 7 (1982).
6. Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873 n.2
(1975).
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Court and to insulate their decisions from Supreme Court review.7
These events have captured the attention of the legal community in a way that a state constitutional convention's increase in
gubernatorial powers or modernization of fiscal and budgetary provisions never could. Such structural or political reforms were relegated to the domain of political scientists." Their interests include
the structure and power allocations of state and local government,
as well as the ways in which such powers actually are exercised.
Lawyers and law teachers, by contrast, tend to be concerned with
the extent and limit of governmental powers and with the interpretation of constitutional provisions in litigation. It is no surprise,
therefore, that the state bill of rights "explosion" has captured the
attention of lawyers and legal scholars. This new attention, however, has been limited to state constitutional protection of individual liberties as an alternative to federal constitutional protections.
The field of state constitutional law, like federal constitutional
law, is by no means limited to cases involving individual rights.
Numerous other areas of law involve the application of state constitutions. The structure and power of state and local governments,
the state judicial system, taxation and public finance, and public
education all are affected by the state constitution and its interpretation. Furthermore, state constitutions do not differ significantly
from one another." State constitutional law generally is not treated
7. Thus there are both substantive and procedural aspects to this rediscovery of state
bills of rights. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
8.Political scientists have done a great deal of the work on state constitutional law. See
McClain, Forward,27 WASH. U.L.Q. 309, 311 (1942). Between the 1920's and the late 1940's,
the American Political Science Review published annually an article on state constitutional
law. See, e.g., Tenbroek & Graham, State Constitutional Law in 1945-1946, 40 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 703 (1946). See also Swindler, supra note 1, at 587 n.54 ("[T]his excellent twentyyear series of annual surveys was discontinued in 1949. The present writer has hopes of
seeing the series revived in the near future."). Unfortunately, to date, Professor Swindler's
hopes have not been fulfilled.
Political scientists also have begun to recognize the revitalization of state bills of rights.
See, e.g., Freidelbaum, Independent State Grounds: Contemporary Invitations to Judicial
Activism, in M. PORTER & G. TARR,STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 23 (1982); Friedelbaum, Constitutional Law and Judicial Policy Making, in R.
LEHNE & A. ROSENTHAL, POLITICS INNEW JERSEY 197 (2d ed. 1979); Haas, The "New Federalism" and Prisoners'Rights: State Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective, 34 W.
POL. Q. 552 (1981); Porter, State Supreme Courts and the Legacy of the Warren Court:
Some Old Inquiriesfor a New Situation, 8 PumIus 55 (1978).
9. Professor Frank Grad noted: "In spite of their enormous diversity, it is probably safe
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as a matter of legal theory or as a subject for comparative treatment; rather, it usually is thought of as a parochial matter. The
recurring themes and issues throughout state constitutional law,
however, make it susceptible to treatment on a comparative or "all
states" basis. This Article will discuss the role and function of
state constitutions in our legal system, and then will survey a number of common issues likely to arise under any state's constitution.

II.

THE THEORY OF STATES AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONS

At the time of the American Revolution, the Continental Congress declined to recommend a single, uniform constitutional format for the colonies to adopt. 10 Congress did not even require
to say that the similarities between governmental structure in different states are considerably greater than their differences. . . ." Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and
Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928, 941 (1968). This similarity was present from the
beginning:
The general similarity of all these early state constitutions is another circumstance worthy of remark. The ready acceptance of closely parallel institutions, formulas, and political ideas, by communities so unlike each other in the
life and habits of their people and in their industrial and commerical interests,
was beyond the expectation of some of the best minds of the day.
Black, The Formationof the First State Constitutions,7 CONST. Ray. 22, 31 (1923).
Commentators have attempted to categorize state constitutions:
1) "[New England states' constitutions are] old fashioned in type... based on
the outgrown system of town government, and.., so difficult of amendment
that they retain many obsolete features .... "
2) "[Seven constitutions written between 1840 and 1865 are] democratic in
principle and excellent in tone, but do not include the experience of later years
3) The third category of constitutions incorporates "provisions emphasized as
the result of reconstruction in the south, and adaptation to economic changes
north and south. ..

."

4) The fourth category of constitutions belongs to "new mining and agricultural states of the far west, and.., states that felt compelled to readjust their
governmental systems to changed social, economic and political conditions resulting from war and national growth."
J. DEALEY, GROWTH OF AmERIcAN STATE CONsTrruTmoNS 118-19 (1915). See also Elazar, The
Principles and Traditions Underlying State Constitutions, 12 PuBLIus 11, 18-22 (1982)
(describing six "constitutional patterns:" Commonwealth, Commercial Republic, Southern
Contractual, Civil Code, Frame of Government, and Managerial).
10. W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONs: REPUBLIcAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 55-56 (1980). See also G. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 125 passim (1969); Black, supra note

9, at 22, 99, 237; Sturm, The Development of American State Constitutions, 12 Punujus 57
(1982).
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states to have a constitution. As sovereign entities, each state embarked on the first experiment in drafting constitutions1 1 on its
own, well before the adoption of the Federal Constitution. The
early state constitutions provided a conduit for translating the
"rights of Englishmen ' 12 and American notions of governmental
structure into positive law. Those attempts at constitution writing,
with their sometimes questioned legitimacy," form the basis for
14
modern American constitutional law.
Maintenance of the states' residual sovereignty became the

"means and price of the formation of the Union"1 5 when the states
later adopted the Federal Constitution. This reminder to the mod-

ern generation of the historic place of the states, their changing

role over time," and the importance of their independence in the
evolution of our federal system provides a predicate for a study of
current federalism issues.1

11. See generally Note, The Theory of State Constitutions,1966 UTAH L. Rav. 542.
12. See generally A. HOWARD, Tan ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CHARTA AND CONSTI-

TUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 203-15 (1968); G. WOOD, supra note 10, at 259 passim; Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary
Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978); Swindler, "Rights of Englishmen" Since 1776: Some
Anglo-American Notes, 124 U. PA. L. Rav. 1083 (1976).
13. W. ADAMS, supra note 10, at 63-64. "Most of the bodies that framed constitutions in
this formative period had not originally been elected to do any such job, nor had they been
given any specific mandate for it. Most of them did not submit to popular ratification of the
constitutions that they drew." J. HuRsT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS

202 (1950).
14. States admitted to the Union in the nineteenth century trace many of their constitutional provisions to the original colonies. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 635,
493 P.2d 880, 884, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 156 (1972) ("The delegates were advised when the
Declaration of Rights was first proposed that the first eight sections had been taken from
the Constitution of New York and that all others were from the Constitution of Iowa.");
Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123, 128 (1981) ("Provisions like these have antecedents as early as New Hampshire's 1783 constitution, coming to Oregon by way of Ohio and
Indiana."); Palmer, The Sources of the Oregon Constitution,5 OR.L. REv. 200 (1926). See
also L. FRMDMAN,A HISTORY OF AmCAN LAW 108 (1973) ("Among the states, there was a
great deal of copying, of constitutional stare decisis."); Swindler, State ConstitutionalLaw:
Some Representative Decisions, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 166, 173 (1967) ("Historically, new
states in the westward movement of the nation borrowed in whole or in part from the constitutions of older states in preparing their first constitutions.").
15. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
16. Grad, supra note 9, at 929; Crihfield & Smothers, The States in the Federal System,
34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1018 (1959).
17. These issues arise throughout the law, and a study of states as entities and as integral
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Tracing the westward movement of constitutional concepts in
the original state constitutions as they were copied and modified
by newly admitted states can be an important component of interpreting present day constitutions.1 8 States seeking admission to the
Union after it was formed had to be approved by Congress. e Congressional review of the prospective state's constitution was an integral part of the approval process and Congress sometimes demanded changes.2 °
A.

State ConstitutionalLaw as a Process of Lawmaking

Are state constitutions neutral expressions of what is thought to
be the best structure of government and statement of people's
rights? Or are state constitutions instruments of lawmaking
through which interest groups or segments of society seek the
grand prize of lawmaking, striving to achieve constitutional status
for the policy they advocate?
The two factors, of permanence and a new avenue to change,
were closely related in the use of state constitutions for the enactment of particular policies. Men felt that legislation in constitutional form would be harder to upset, because the procedure
for amending a constitution was more involved than passing a
statute ....
[B]ecause of its independence from the everyday
parts of a federation can provide perspective in evaluating such issues.
The myth of federalism should not be confused with the reality of federalism,
which is the ever-evolving compromise between those who argue for tilting the
balance of functions and powers in favor of either national or state government
based on what they perceive as the advantages that flow from either form.
Note, SeparatingMyth from Reality in FederalismDecisions: A Perspective of American
Federalism- Past and Present,35 VAND. L. REv. 161, 161-62 (1982). See generally Symposium, State Courts and Federalismin the 1980's, 22 WM. & Mtav L. REv. 599 (1981); Symposium on Federalism, 86 YALE L.J. 1018 (1977).
A focus on federalism may also generate interest in a comparative study of other federal
constitutional systems. See generally W. MummHY & J. TAmNNHAUS, COMPAMAIrv CONSmTuToNAL LAW (1977); Symposium, State ConstitutionalDesign in the United States and
Other Federal Systems, 12 PUBLIUS 1 (1982).
18. See Swindler, supra note 14.
19. U.S. CONsT. art. IV,

§ 3.

20. "Congressional practice early conditioned the entrance of a new state on the adoption
of a constitution satisfactory to Congress." J. HURST, supra note 13, at 201. See generally
State ex rel. Witt v. State Canvassing Bd., 78 N.M. 682, 437 P.2d 143 (1968); Monnet, Violations By a State of the Conditions of Its Enabling Act, 10 COLUM. L. REv. 591 (1910);
Wickersham, New States and Constitutions,21 YALE L.J. 1 (1911).
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institutions of government, the constitution-making process
might offer opportunities for changes that could not be had
through other channels. This independence might not only facilitate certain changes, but also insure that, once made, they
would stay.2

This conception of the state constitution as a vehicle for "constitu-

tional legislation" is very different from the way we view the Federal Constitution, at least since its original adoption.22
Referring to "constitutional legislation in state constitutions," a
noted commentator stated: "In most cases such specific enactments of policy did not direct, but merely recorded, the currents of
social change. ' 23 Recent events indicate, however, that proposed
amendments to state constitutions sometimes provide a forum for
resolving major societal conflicts. Such issues include state and local taxing and spending,24 casino gambling, progressive income
taxes, 25 school busing,26 and environmental protection. These are
certainly contested cases in which societal conflicts are decided directly. Furthermore, we now are seeing more innovative judicial interpretations of state constitutions - the other component of the
27
ongoing constitutional process.

21. J. HURST, supra note 13, at 243-44. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 104. Cf. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 63-66 (1977). See generally
Crain & Tollison, Constitutional Change in an Interest-Group Perspective, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 165 (1979); Lutz, The Purposes of American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIus 27, 31
(1982).
22. As to the concept of "constitutional legislation," see Dodd, The Function of a State
Constitution, 30 POL. Sc. Q. 201, 215 (1915); McMurray, Some Tendencies in Constitution
Making, 2 CALIF. L. REV. 203, 209-11 (1914); Note, California's Constitutional Amendomania, 1 STAN. L. REv. 279, 287 (1949).
23. J. HURST, supra note 13, at 246. See also E. FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 172 (2d ed. 1965); Press, Assessing the Policy and OperationalImplicationsof State
Constitutional Change, 12 PUBLIUS 99, 108-11 (1982).
24. See infra notes 161 & 162 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 221.
26. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
27. Horack, Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation,3 VAND. L. REv.
382, 384 (1950) ("Indirectly, the executive, the legislatures, and the courts are, through the
exercise of their respective functions, interpreting and, to the extent that their interpretations achieve results which previously had not obtained, amending the constitution."). See
also Dodd, The Problem of State ConstitutionalConstruction, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 635, 637
(1920) ("Inasmuch as the constitution is a briefer and more general document than a statute, the share of the court in moulding the constitution by interpretation is proportionately
greater."); Note, State Constitutional Change: The Constitutional Convention, 54 VA. L.
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If state constitutional amendments reflect a process of purposive
lawmaking - an alternative to the well-known techniques of legislative or judicial changes in the law - what are the implications of
using this lawmaking method? Do objective standards exist to determine the propriety of "constitutional legislation?"2 A review of
state constitutional provisions, particularly the doctrine of "negative implication" in "grants" of power to state legislatures,29
reveals the potential rigidity that can result from legislating
through the constitution. Interestingly, most problems resulting
from constitutional rigidity are unintentional, 0 revealing the need
for a kind of predictive thinking not usually required in the training of lawyers.31

REV. 995, 998-1000 (1968). But see E. CORNWEL, J. GOODMAN & W. SWANSON, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE POLITICS OF THE REVISION PROCESS IN-SEVEN STATES 8 (1975):
We should not overemphasize the importance of constitutional change by
interpretation at the state level, however. Because of the detailed language of
most state constitutions, conservative legislatures and judges have been inclined to follow a rather strict construction. There has been far less interpretative constitutional development at the state than at the national level. As a
method of constitutional change, it is probably true that interpretation has
been less important than the more formal processes of amendment and
revision.
Id.
The constitutional process continues when proposed constitutional amendments seek to
"overrule" judicial interpretations of constitutions. See infra notes 36 & 97-100 and accompanying text.
28. Professor Grad's criteria for inclusion and exclusion of provisions in state constitutions provide extremely valuable guidelines. See Grad, supra note 9, at 942-72. See also
GRAD,THE DRAFTING OF STATE CONsTrrumoNS: WORKMNG PAPERS FOR A MANUAL (National
Municipal League 1967).
29. Grad, supra note 9, at 966. See also infra notes 148 & 149 and accompanying text.
30. Cf. Merton, The UnanticipatedConsequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM. Soc.
REV. 894 (1936); Rose, Law and the Causationof Social Problems, 16 Soc. PROB. 33 (1968).
31. Cf. Reisman, Law and Social Science: A Report on Michael and Wechsler's Classbook on Criminal Law and Administration,50 YALE L.J. 636, 638 (1941):
The student has bent his efforts to constructing legal rules out of case-book
cases by inductive reasoning. That is essentially an analytical job. He has used
his imagination in extrapolating cases to cover hypothetical situations suggested by his teachers, but he has seldom invented such situations. The draftman's job, on the other hand, is imaginative and synthetic. He must envisage
the controversies of the future, and organize opposed social forces into harmony for the resolution of these controversies.
Id. See generally Goldstein, The Unfulfilled Promise of Legal Education, in LAW IN A
CHANGING AMERICA 157, 160 (G. Hazard ed. 1968) (Case method "makes the lawyer especially skilled in showing the limits and inadequacies of what is proffered by others.").
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B. State Constitutions as Documents of Limitation
State constitutions are usually contrasted with their federal
counterpart by characterizing the former as limits on governmental
power rather than grants of power. When the Union was formed,
the states retained almost plenary governmental power exercised
primarily by their legislatures.2 This power was limited only to the
extent that the states granted powers to the federal government,
agreed to restrictions on state power in the Federal Constitution,
or imposed limitations on themselves in their own constitutions.
According to the Supreme Court of Kansas: "It is fundamental
that our state constitution limits rather than confers powers.
Where the constitutionality of a statute is involved, the question
presented is, therefore, not whether the act is authorized by the
constitution, but whether it is prohibited thereby."33
The primary focus on the extent of legislative powers one encounters in federal constitutional law other than civil liberties, is
not as prevalent in state constitutional law, which tends to focus
on limits on legislative power.3 4 Accordingly, the most important
products of judicial interpretation of the Federal Constitution are
implied powers, while at the state level implied limitations are
most important.3 5
The general characterization of state constitutions as documents
of limitation is correct but oversimplified. Many provisions in
modern state constitutions were adopted to overcome earlier judicial interpretations of the constitution prohibiting the exercise of
power in question. 6 Such provisions are grants of power, or at
32. J. HURST,

DEALING WITH STATUTES 5 (1982).
33. State ex rel. Schneider v. Kennedy, 225 Kan. 13, 20, 587 P.2d 844, 850 (1978).
34. But see infra note 216 and accompanying text.

35. Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in ConstitutionalLaw, 29

YALE

L.J.

137, 160 (1919).
36. J. HURST, supra note 13, at 245. "It was not always the legislature which was bypassed through constitutional enactment. The process was used also to overrule judicial de-

cisions adverse to some substantial interest or demand in the state." Id. See also Dodd,
supra note 22, at 208-09.
It is often urged that state constitutions are limitations of power; that state
legislatures have all power not forbidden to them by their state constitutions;
and that therefore many provisions which have of late come into these constitutions are mere surplusage insofar as they expressly confer power on legislatures. But such grants have in many cases become necessary in order to loosen
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least the removal of limitations. States also may adopt grants of
power to remove constitutional doubt3 7 or to ratify preexisting
practices.
If a state constitution usually limits legislative power, what is its
function with reference to executive and judicial power? This question will be explored in the coverage of constitutional issues surrounding those branches.
III.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

The question of the relation of the States to the federal government is the cardinal question of our constitutional system
Woodrow Wilson38

The relationship of state constitutions - the supreme law of a
state - to federal law under the supremacy clause is an important
concept. A state constitutional provision may be unconstitutional
if it conflicts with the Federal Constitution, 9 federal common
law,40 or validly enacted federal statutes, treaties, or administrative
regulations. Interstate compacts may override state constitutions
under certain circumstances.4 1
the effect of broad constitutional guaranties as interpreted by the courts. Many
of the later constitutional provisions which in legal theory do not broaden such
power are justified, therefore, because in legal fact they do broaden such
power. To some extent at least state constitutions are becoming a grant rather
than a limitation of power.
Id. As to the techniques of judicial interpretation which, through "negative implication,"
turn these grants of power into limitations, see Grad, supra note 9, at 966.
37. J. HURST, supra note 13, at 245.
38. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 173 (1908).
39. Article VI of the United States Constitution specifically provides that federal law is
supreme, "any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI. (emphasis added).
28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976) provides for an appeal to the United States Supreme Court
when the highest court of a state upholds a state statute in the face of a federal constitutional challenge. "It has long been established that a state constitutional provision is a 'statute' within the meaning of § 1257(2)." Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
79 (1980).
For a listing of state constitutional provisions declared unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1623 passim (1973).

40. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
41. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951); Zimmerman & Wendell, The
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Utilizing the state constitution as a vehicle for lawmaking can
influence the outcome of a federal constitutional challenge. For example, in Reitman v. Mulkey,'42 the "repeal" of state open-housing
statutes was accomplished through constitutional amendment
rather than legislative repeal. The United States Supreme Court
noted:
Private discriminations in housing were now not only free from
[the statutes] but they also enjoyed a far different status than
was true before the passage of those statutes. The right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on racial grounds,
was now embodied in the State's basic charter, immune from
legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level of the
state government. Those practicing racial discriminations need
no longer rely solely on their personal choice. They could now
invoke express constitutional authority, free4 from censure or interference of any kind from official sources.

.

The Court's survey of the effects of constitutional legislation
reveals exactly why this technique was utilized." Moreover, this
Interstate Compact and Dyer v. Sims, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 931 (1951). See also, Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Co-operative Federalism, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
825 (1963).
42. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
43. Id. at 377. The choice of the constitution, rather than other lawmaking methods, for
enactment of law also can influence other kinds of judicial decisions. For example, in conflict
of laws, a court's evaluation of local public policy in relation to the law of another jurisdiction may be influenced by the fact that such public policy is expressed in the constitution.
See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S. 133 (1961).
44. A review of all the cases in which the United States Supreme Court has invalidated
provisions of state constitutions, see supra note 39, indicates that it rarely makes a difference that it is a constitutional provision rather than a statute under review. See, e.g., Railway Employees' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956); Fisk v. Jefferson Police
Jury, 116 U.S. 131, 135 (1885) ("It is well settled that a provision of a State Constitution
may be a law impairing the obligation of a contract as well as one found in an ordinary
statute."). But see Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.) (invalidating amendment to
Alabama Constitution as excluding voters on the basis of race), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S.
933 (1949) ("Mr. Justice Reed, in view of the fact that a constitutional provision of a state is
involved ... is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and the case set
down for argument.").
Thus, the emphasis on the state constitution in Reitman appears to be unique. But see
Widmar v. Vincent, 50 U.S.L.W. 4062, 4066 (1981) ("It is also unnecessary for us to decide
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, a state interest, derived from its own constitution,
could ever outweigh free speech interests protected by the First Amendment.") (emphasis
added, footnote omitted).
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technique bypassed the legislature. The fact that the legislature
was bypassed, however, influenced later federal constitutional anal45
ysis by the United States Supreme Court.
The reapportionment battles culminated in judicial invalidation
of many state constitutional provisions. 46 More contemporary examples of conflicts between the state and federal constitutions
arose from attempts to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA). For example, Florida's constitution prohibited the legislature from considering any federal constitutional amendment unless
"a majority of the members [of the legislature] have been elected
after the proposed amendment has been submitted for ratification. '47 When Congress submitted the ERA to the states in 1972,
the amendment was considered immediately and passed overwhelmingly by the Florida House of Representatives. 4 The presiding officer of the Florida Senate blocked consideration, however,
because no intervening election had occurred. ERA supporters in
the Florida Senate argued that the Florida requirement conflicted
with article V of the United States Constitution, which exclusively
controlled ratification of federal constitutional amendments. Failing in the political forum, the supporters repaired to federal district court but were unable to obtain a preliminary injunction prior
to the end of the legislative session. 49 By the time the court invalidated Florida's impediment, 50 the political tide had changed. Flor-

45. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.

46. See, e.g., Jackman v. Bodine, 43 N.J. 453, 205 A.2d 713 (1964). This case illustrates
that state courts may declare provisions in their own constitutions unconstitutional on fed-

eral grounds. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court said: "[W]ith respect to
the operation of the Equal Protection Clause, it makes no difference whether a State's ap-

portionment scheme is embodied in its constitution or in statutory provisions." Id. at 584.
For an interesting proposal to reform the reapportionment process, see Adams, A Model
State Reapportionment Process: The Continuing Quest for "Fairand Effective Representation," 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 825 (1979).
47. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1968). The 1978 Florida Constitution Revision Commission
recommended deletion of this provision. Note, A Summary and Background Analysis of the
Proposed 1978 Constitutional Revisions, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. R~v. 1115, 1164-65 (1979). The

voters, however, rejected the Commission's recommendation.
48. Fla. House Jour. 904-05 (1972). The vote was 91-4.
49. Trombetta v. Florida, 339 F. Supp. 1359 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
50. Trombetta v. Florida, 353 F. Supp. 575 (M.D. Fla. 1973). See generally Dodd,
Amending the FederalConstitution, 30 YALE L.J. 321 (1921); Note, The Process of Constitutional Amendment, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 106 (1979). Cf. Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and Article V: A Framework for Analysis of the Extension and Recission Issues, 127
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ida never ratified the ERA.
A similar series of events took place in Illinois, another of the
major states that failed to ratify the ERA. Apparently, but for an
Illinois constitutional impediment requiring a three-fifths vote to
approve federal constitutional amendments, the ERA might have
been ratified in Illinois. 51
Under the supremacy clause, state constitutional provisions are
vulnerable to conflicts with federal statutes as well as with the
Federal Constitution. Such federal statutes, however, must be
"made in pursuance" of the Federal Constitution.5 2 These statutes
must be traced to Congress' lawmaking powers. But the extent of
Congress' power is different under, for example, the spending
power than under the commerce power. In exercising its commerce
power, Congress may preempt, or directly override state constitutions. The developing law based on the Supreme Court's decision
in National League of Cities v. Usery,53 limiting Congress' use of
its power under the commerce clause, provides the only limit on
54
the use of this power.

Interestingly, Congress recently used the commerce power to
preempt a state constitutional provision at the request of the ArU. PA. L. Rav. 494 (1978).
51. See Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. IM. 1975); A. LoUSIN, ILLINOIS CONSTIUTnONAL LAW 11-12 (1979) (mimeo.). See also Kimble v. Swackhamer, 584 P.2d 161 (Nev.),
stay denied, 439 U.S. 1385 (1978) (upholding nonbinding referendum on the ERA).
52. U.S. CONST. art. VI.

53. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See generally Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977);
Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights
to Essential Government Services, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 1065 (1977).
54. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc., Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 4654
(1981) and United Trans. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 4315 (1982), the Supreme Court further refined the Usery limitations on Congress' powers.
An interesting parallel development concerning federalism seems to be taking place in the
interpretation of federal statutes passed under the spending power. In Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), the Supreme Court held that "if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously." 451 U.S. at 17. See also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 50 U.S.L.W. 4925, 4928-34 (1982).
See generally Baker, Making the Most of Pennhurst's "Clear Statement" Rule, 31 CATS. U.
L. REv. 439 (1982). Cf. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 527, 540 (1947) (federalism concerns in interpreting commerce clause
legislation).
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kansas congressional delegation,55 thus overriding Arkansas' constitutional ten percent usury limit.5 6 The Arkansas Supreme Court
initially declared this congressional "amendment" to the Arkansas
Constitution unconstitutional as outside Congress' commerce
58
power, 57 but the court later reversed itself.
Although Congress, through the spending power, may reach
many subjects normally reserved to the states,5" it may not do so
directly. Congress must accomplish its aims indirectly through conditions attached to federal spending programs or grants. State constitutions may make state compliance with such conditions difficult. For example, Congress required that states enact "certificate
of need" legislation as a condition for the receipt of federal health
planning funds. Prior to this requirement, the North Carolina Supreme Court had ruled that state "certificate of need" legislation
was unconstitutional as granting special privileges and monopolies
in violation of the North Carolina Constitution."0 North Carolina,
therefore, argued that the congressional requirement was an interference with its state sovereignty. A federal district court held:
It must be remembered that this Act is not compulsory on the
State .... [I]t does not impose a mandatory requirement to
enact legislation on the State; it gives to the states an option to
enact such legislation and, in order to induce that enactment,
offers financial assistance. Such legislation conforms to the pattern generally of federal grants to the states and is not "coer-

55. 125 CoNG. REc. H993 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Anthony). "We are

asking this Congress to give... temporary relief until once again, in a Constitutional Convention, the people of our State can decide what is and what is not usury." Id.
56. P.L. 96-104 § 301 provided: "This Act shall apply only in those States having a constitutional provision which provides that all contracts for a greater rate of interest than 10 per
centum per annum shall be void, as to principle and interest." This provision applied only
to Arkansas. See Long, Trends in Usury Legislation-CurrentInterest Overdue, 34 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 325, 328-30 (1980); Note, Usury Legislation-Its Effects on the Economy
and a Proposalfor Reform, 33 VAND. L. Rav. 199, 204-05 (1980).
57. McInnis v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 2469 (Ark. Dec. 29, 1980).

58. McInnis v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 767 (Ark. 1981). See also, Stephens
Security Bank v. Eppivic Corp., 411 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Ark. 1976).
59. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947); Stewart

Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586-87 (1937).
60. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hospital, Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 551, 193 S.E.2d
729, 736 (1973). See generally Note, Hospital Regulation After Aston Park: Substantive

Due Process in North Carolina, 52 N.C.L. Rav. 763 (1974).
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cive" in the constitutional sense."1
This decision left North Carolina with the choice of foregoing the
federal funds, amending its constitution, or seeking a different in62
terpretation from its supreme court.
Congress may choose not to impose conditions in federal grant
programs that require a state to do something that its constitution
prohibits. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965 provided federal funds to assist disadvantaged children in
both public and private schools.63 The legislative history indicated
that members of Congress knew of state constitutional provisions
restricting state involvement in private, and particularly religious,
education. Congress clearly expressed its intent to defer to such
restrictions.14 Under such circumstances, the United States Supreme Court held: "The correct rule is that the 'federal law' under
Title I is to the effect that state law should not be disturbed."' 5
The issue was not the extent of Congress' power, but rather, how
Congress actually exercised that power. "The actual extent of central intervention in the governance of our affairs is determined far
less by the formal power distribution than by the sheer existence

61. North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532, 535-36 (E.D.N.C. 1977),
aff'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
62. North Carolina recently reenacted its certificate of need legislation. Developments,
supra note 5, at 1339 n.40. This type of result is drawing an increasing chorus of criticism,
especially since National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See, e.g., Brown,
Federal Funds and National Supremacy: The Role of State Legislatures in Federal Grant
Programs, 28 AM. U. L. REv. 279 (1979); Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty:
The JudicialRole, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 847 (1979); Note, Toward New Safeguards on Conditional Spending: Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 726
(1977); Note, PracticalFederalism After National League of Cities: A Proposal,69 GEO.
L.J. 773 (1981); Note, Federal Interference with Checks and Balances in State Government: A ConstitutionalLimit on the Spending Power, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 402 (1979); Note,
Taking Federalism Seriously: Limiting State Acceptance of National Grants, 90 YALE L.J.
1694 (1981).

Usery, of course, was a commerce power, rather than a spending power case. See North
Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. at 536 n.10. But see supra note 54.

63. 20 U.S.C. § 241(a) (1976) repealed by Education Amendments of 1978, title I, §
101(c), 92 Stat. 2200, 20 U.S.C. § 2701 (Supp. IV 1980).
64. Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 416-19 (1974) ("Whatever the case might be if there
were no expression of specific congressional intent, Title I evinces a clear intention that
state constitutional spending proscriptions not be preempted as a condition of accepting
federal funds."). See also Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
65. 417 U.S. at 419.
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of the states and their political power to influence the action of the
national authority." 66 In the Title I example, federal legislators ensured that prevailing state notions concerning spending for education, reflected in state constitutions, would not be disturbed, not
because the federal legislators lacked power,6 7 but because politically they did not want to exercise that power to upset deeply held
state values.
IV.

THE REDISCOVERY OF STATE DECLARATIONS OF RIGHTS

The state bill of rights "explosion," although not the main
theme of this Article, presents important substantive and procedural lessons about state constitutional law. Observations such as the
following by the Alaska Supreme Court still may startle some lawyers and judges:
While we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards
imposed upon us by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are free, and we are
under a duty, to develop additional constitutional rights and
privileges under our Alaska Constitution . . . . We need not
stand by idly and passively, waiting for constitutional direction
from the highest court of the land. 8
The power of state supreme courts to reject decisions of the
United States Supreme Court seems to contradict our fundamental
understanding of constitutional law. Unraveling this apparent contradiction provides a number of lessons:
1) Most of the protections of the Bill of Rights were "selectively
incorporated" into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment so as to make them applicable to the states - a relatively
recent development. 9 This observation emphasizes that concepts

66. Wechsler, supra note 15, at 544. 67. There was an argument that first amendment issues would arise if Congress sought to
mandate provision of federal resources to religious schools. The Court did not reach this
question. 417 U.S. at 421-22.
68. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970) (footnote omitted).

69. See generally R.

CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS

(1981); Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAv. L.
REV. 489, 493-95 (1977); Henkin, "Selective Incorporation"in the Fourteenth Amendment,
73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).

Monrad Paulsen observed in 1951: "If our liberties are not protected in Des Moines the
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of constitutional protections predated the Federal Constitution.7 0
2) Identical state and federal constitutional language can have
71
different interpretations.
3) Notions of federalism can constrain the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the fourteenth amendment in ways
that do not affect state supreme courts. For example, when the Supreme Court declined to invalidate Texas' school finance law in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,7 21 the
Court revealed its concerns about federalism. Several state supreme courts, striking down school financing schemes despite Rodriguez, indicated their own lack of concern for the federalism issue. 71 Of course, questions regarding the judicial function remain,
but they are horizontal, intrastate matters without the additional
vertical, federalism concerns.

only hope is in Washington." Paulsen, State Constitutions,State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REV. 620, 642 (1951).
70. It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions textually
identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to mirror their federal counterpart. The lesson of history is otherwise: the Bill of Rights was based upon corresponding provisions of the first state constitutions, rather than the reverse.
People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329
(1975). See also Bravenec, The New Hampshire Bill of Rights in the Constitution of 1784
and the Treatment of DissentersDuring the American Revolution, 8 N.H.B.J. 244 (1966).
Of course, some state constitutions now contain material taken from the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., Student Public Interest Research Group v. Byrne, 86 N.J. 592, 432 A.2d
507 (1981).
71. See, e.g., State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 369 n.6, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (1974); Brennan,
supra note 69, at 500.
72. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
It must be remembered, also, that every claim arising under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the relationship between national and state
power under our federal system. Questions of federalism are always inherent in
the process of determining whether a State's laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 44. See generally Maltz, Federalismand the FourteenthAmendment: A Comment on
Democracy and Distrust, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 209 (1981).
73. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976);
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). See also
Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council, 635 P.2d 108, 115 (Wash.
1981) (Supreme Court interpretation of the fourteenth amendment "must operate in all areas of the nation and hence it invariably represents the lowest common denominator.");
Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARv.
L. Rav. 1212 (1978).
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4) The language of state constitutional provisions often is more
detailed than that contained in the Federal Bill of Rights or the
fourteenth amendment.7 4 Such detail focuses attention on the text
of the provision at issue and related provisions of the state
constitution.
5) State supreme courts may reject the United States Supreme
Court's technique of analysis. For example, state courts may replace the suspect class and fundamental rights approach for equal
protection and due process issues with a "rational basis with
teeth" test. 5 Counsel may argue that a court should adopt these
different techniques of analysis, or discover that the state court already has indicated a new approach. Thus, not just the result may
be different; the underlying judicial approach to constitutional
analysis also may diverge from the more familiar federal constitutional doctrine.
6) The familiar fourteenth amendment requirement of state ac77
tion" may not be present in state constitutional protections.
74. Howard, supra note 1, at 935; Note, The New Federalism: Toward a PrincipledInterpretationof the State Constitution,29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 318 (1977).
For a survey of all state constitutional protections, see Sachs, FundamentalLiberties and
Rights: A 50-State Index, CONSTITUTIONS

OF THE UNITED STATES: NATIONAL AND STATE

(Leg-

islative Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University 1980).
75. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 491, 303 A.2d 273, 282, cert. denied, 414
U.S. 976 (1973) ("But we have not found helpful the concept of a 'fundamental' right. No
one has successfully defined the term for this purpose ....
Ultimately, a court must weigh
the nature of the restraint or the denial against the apparent public justification, and decide
whether the State action is arbitrary."); Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 79, 399 N.E.2d 1188,
1194, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 175, (1979) ("So one-sided a concept of [federal] due process we
regard as unacceptable. In our view what is required is a balancing of the harm to the individual resulting from the condition imposed against the benefit sought by the government
through its enforcement."). But see Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197
(1976).
A rejection of a technique of analysis also led the California Supreme Court to require
busing absent a finding of intentional discrimination. See infra notes 98 & 99 and accompanying text. As to the technique used by the California Supreme Court in invalidating restrictions on Medicaid financing for abortion, see Note, Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Myers: Abortion Funding Restrictions as an UnconstitutionalCondition, 70 CALIP. L. REv. 978 (1982).
76. See generally Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Glennon & Nowak, A
FunctionalAnalysis of the FourteenthAmendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SuP.
CT. REv. 221.
77. State v. Nelson, 354 So. 2d 540 (La. 1978); State v. Helfrich, 600 P.2d 816 (Mont.
1979); State v. Brecht, 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971); Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981); Burkoff, Not So Private Searches
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Many state constitutional provisions, like many statutes, grant
positive rights in specific terms and therefore may apply to nongovernmental action.7"
7) Constitutional doctrines long ago repudiated by the United
States Supreme Court may still be viable as matters of state constitutional law. The most important examples are "substantive due
process" in the field of economic regulation, 79 which many states
still utilize,8 0 and the doctrine of nondelegation of legislative
authority.8 1
8) State constitutions may contain individual constitutional
rights having no analogue in the Federal Constitution. For example, equal rights provisions,8 2 requirements of open access to courts
for redress of injuries, 3 rights to privacy, 4 and specific protections

and the Constitution,66 CORNELL L. REV. 627 (1981); Note, Private Abridgement of Speech
and the State Constitutions,90 YALE L.J. 165 (1980); 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 331 (1982).
78. See, e.g., Note, State ConstitutionalRight to Damages for PrivateDiscriminationin
Employment: Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 28 DE PAUL L. REv. 229 (1978); Note, Free
Speech, The Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE L.J. 522 (1982).
79. See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Processand the Supreme Court: An Exhu-

mation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 34. But see B.

SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND

(1980); Reznick, The Constitutionality of Business Regulation in the
Burger Court: Revival and Restraint, 33 HAST. L.J. 1 (1981).
80. See generally Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distributors, 285 N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141
(1974); State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487 (1971); Dykstra, Legislative Favoritism Before the Courts, 27 IND. L.J. 38 (1951); Hetherington, State Economic
Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. L. REV. 226 (1958); Howard, supra
note 1 at 881-83; Kirby, Expansive JudicialReview of Economic Regulation Under State
Constitutions: The Case for Realism, 48 TENN. L. REV. 241 (1981); Paulsen, "Natural
Rights" - A Constitutional Doctrine in Indiana, 25 IND. L.J. 123 (1950); Paulsen, The
Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950); Note,
Counterrevolution in State Constitutional Law, 15 STAN. L. REV. 309.(1963); Comment,
Substantive Due Process in the States Revisited, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 384 (1957); Developments, supra note 5, at 1463-93.
81. "State courts have exhibited an inclination significantly greater than that of the federal courts to hold invalid delegations of power which vest an agency with untrammeled and
uncontrolled discretionary power." 1 COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 31 (1965). See
also Martin, Legislative Delegations of Power and Judicial Review-Preventing Judicial
Impotence, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 43 (1980); Note, Florida'sAdherence to the Doctrine of
Nondelegation of Legislative Power, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 541 (1979).
82. See generally Driscoll & Rouse, Through a Glass Darkly: A Look at State Equal
Rights Amendments, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1282 (1978); Note, One Small Word: Sexual
Equality Through the State Constitution,6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 947 (1978); Comment, Equal
Rights Provisions: The Experience Under State Constitutions, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1086
(1977).
83. See generally Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d
THE CONSTITUTION
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for the incarcerated 5 may be found in state constitutions. Lawyers
therefore often have wide-ranging opportunities under state constitutions for formulating arguments."6
Because of the absence of federal analogues, state courts necessarily have interpreted these constitutional provisions independently of United States Supreme Court cases. Therefore, the state
courts have developed a truly independent constitutional jurisprudence under some of these provisions. This body of law can provide an approach for state courts to emulate when they seek to
develop an independent interpretation of state constitutional provisions that have federal analogues.8 7
The rediscovery of state bills of rights is criticized as being reactionary.88 In other words, state courts simply disagree with Supreme Court interpretations of cognate federal constitutional provisions. They therefore analyze the state constitutional problem in
the same modes as the federal issue and, after drawing heavily on

218 (Ky. 1973); McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionalityof Product Liability
Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 579, 600-41 (1981); Note, Article I, Section 21: Access
to Court in Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 871 (1977).
84. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975); Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's
Proposed Right of Privacy, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 671 (1978); Note, Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State ConstitutionalLaw, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 631 (1977).
85. See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981); Kanter, Dealingwith Death:
The Constitutionality of Capital Punishment in Oregon, 16 WILLAMETrE L.J. 1, 30-52
(1979); Comment, Tennessee Constitutional Standardsfor Conditions of PretrialDetention: A Mandate for Jail Reform, 48 TENN. L. REv. 688 (1981).
86. For example, due process and equal protection notions can be argued, in different
form, under prohibitions on special privileges, monopolies, and special laws.
87. But see Kelman, Foreword: Rediscovering the State ConstitutionalBill of Rights, 27
WAYNE L. REv. 413, 429 (1981) ("even the most independent-minded state courts do not
engage in zero-based state interpretation"). Of course state courts also can play an important role in developing federal constitutional law. See generally Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 640 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961); Karst, "Serrano v. Priest":
A State Court's Responsibilitiesand Opportunities in the Development of Federal Constitutional Law, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 720 (1972).
88. See Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From a Reactionary Approach,
9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981). See also Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 606 n.1 (1981) ("I must confess to some
misgivings about the extent to which some of this commentary seems to assume that state
constitutional law is simply 'available' to be manipulated to negate Supreme Court decisions
which are deemed unsatisfactory."); Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No
Anchor-JudicialReview Under the California Constitution,6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975
(1979).
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dissenting justices' opinions, 89 reach a different result. A better alternative is for state courts to develop truly independent state constitutional jurisprudence - to create rather than just react. A
fuller understanding of all aspects of state constitutionalism is necessary before this process can begin.
9) Even if a state supreme court is convinced that its constitution provides more extensive rights than the Federal Constitution,
the state court must consider carefully whether these greater rights
for one litigant would interfere with the state9 0 or federal" constitutional rights of other litigants. Going beyond the federal minimum guarantees for one party may deprive the losing party of
other state or federal minimum guarantees. Such deprivations usually would occur, however, only if the party against whom the state
constitutional right was asserted was a private, rather than govern92
mental, entity.
10) State constitutions themselves can address the question of
whether they should be interpreted to provide greater protections
than the Federal Constitution. In 1974, the voters in California
adopted a constitutional provision distinguishing the coverage of
the state and federal constitutions: "Rights guaranteed by this
Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution."13 The next year, the California Supreme
Court observed: "Of course this declaration of constitutional independence did not originate at that recent election; indeed the voters were told the provision was a mere reaffirmation of existing

89. Recent dissenting opinions in the United States Supreme Court seem to be attempt-

ing to convince state supreme court justices that the opinion of the Court is neither binding
nor persuasive. But see Bator, supra note 88, at 606 n.1 ("I regard it as inappropriate for
Supreme Court Justices themselves to campaign to enact into unreviewable state constitutional law dissenting views about federal constitutional law which have been duly rejected
by the United States Supreme Court.").
90. See generally Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 171-73, 432 A.2d 1382, 1388-90
(1981); Collins, supra note 88.
91. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Princeton University v.
Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed per curiam, 102 S. Ct. 867
(1982); Note, State Constitution Creates Right of Access to Private PropertyIndependent
of Federal Constitution, 12 SroN HALL L. REV. 76 (1981); Comment, Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center: Federalism and State Protection of Free Speech, 10 GOLDEN GATE L.
REV. 805 (1980).
92. Developments, supra note 5, at 1335 n.21.
93. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
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law." 4 A recent attempt in Florida to adopt a similar constitutional provision9 5 failed with the rejection of the entire package of
proposals by the 1977-1978 Constitution Revision Commission.9
Interpretations of the state constitution that expand constitutional protections, therefore, are not governed solely by the attitude of state courts. Textual changes to the constitution as in California also can influence courts' decisions. This aspect of the
process of state constitutional lawmaking - textual change - can
be a two-way street. In 1979, just five years after approving article
I, section 24, the California voters approved Proposition 1,11
amending article I, section 7. The amendment prohibited California courts from going beyond the requirements of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment in the use of pupil assignment and school busing remedies. The amendment was intended
to overrule a long series of California decisions ordering such remedies in the absence of intentional segregation, a prerequisite under

94. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 551, 531 P.2d 1099, 1114, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 330
(1975). See also People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 939 n.10, 538 P.2d 237, 245 n.10, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 109, 117 n.10 (1975); Note, The New Federalism:Toward a PrincipledInterpretation
of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REv. 297, 312 n.1l0 (1977) ("Perhaps the most that
can be said is that the amendment represents a public ratification of the court's past decisions that interpret independently the California Constitution.").
95. See D'Alemberte, ConstitutionalRevision Symposium: Introduction, 5 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 565, 567 (1977); Dore, Of Rights Lost and Gained, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. R.v. 610, 612 (1978)
("The purpose of this beguilingly simple proposal was to breathe new life into the declaration of rights of the Florida Constitution. It was to remind the bench and the bar that
federal constitutional rights are only minimum guarantees. They do not exhaust the possibilities for human freedom.").
96. See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
97. (a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that nothing contained herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon the State of
California... any obligations or responsibilitieswhich exceed those imposed
by the Equal ProtectionClause of the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil
transportation.In enforcing this subdivision or any other provision of this
Constitution,no court of this state may impose upon the State of California
. . . any obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil school
assignment or pupil transportation,(1) except to remedy a specific violation
by such party that would also constitute a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2)
unless a federal court would be permitted under federal decisional law to impose that obligation ....
CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 7 (emphasis added) See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
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federal law.9 The United States Supreme Court recently upheld
Proposition 1 against a federal constitutional challenge, 9 illustrating once again the ever present possibility of using amendments to
the constitutional text either to stimulate or overrule independent
state constitutional interpretations. 0 0
11) Judicial interpretation of state constitutions or amendment
of the texts is not the only means by which states may provide
greater protection to their citizens than is required by the Federal
Constitution. Often overlooked means of expanding such protection are by statute, common law, or administrative regulation. The
New York Court of Appeals noted that the Federal Constitution
"leaves the States free to provide greater rights for its citizens
1
through its Constitution, statutes or rulemaking authority."''
One familiar example of expanded protection is the passage of
state "press shield laws" after the Supreme Court ruled in
Branzburg v. Hayes 0 that reporters had no first amendment privilege to refuse to appear before grand juries or refuse to answer
grand jury questions. 0 3 Another example is the continuation of
Medicaid funding for abortions by at least nine states after the
04
Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. McRae.1

98. See generally Crawford v. Board of Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr.
724 (1976); Comment, Proposition1 and Federal Protectionof State ConstitutionalRights,
75 Nw. U. L. REv. 685 (1980).
99. Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 102 S. Ct. 3211 (1982).
100. See Wilkes, The New Federalism in CriminalProcedure Revisited, 64 Ky. L.J. 729,
751 (1976). The possibility of amendment, also illustrated by the death penalty experience
in California, infra note 133, leads some observers to caution state courts not to rely on
state constitutions because of the risk of voter "backlash." See Welsh & Collins, Taking
State ConstitutionsSeriously, XIV THE CENTER MAG. 6, 24-31 (Sept./Oct. 1981). Examples
of such state constitutional "backlash" are not limited to California. For example, a constitutional amendment in Florida recently "overruled" State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla.
1981), in which the state constitution was interpreted as providing greater protection
against the electronic interception of private conversations than does the Federal Constitution. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1982).
101. Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 79, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1193, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 174
(1979) (emphasis added).
102. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
103. The Court had noted that states might provide this protection if they so chose. Id. at
706.
104. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See New York Times, Feb. 8, 1982, at 2, col. 6. The decision in
Harris v. McRae has been rejected uniformly by state courts considering restrictions on
Medicaid funding for abortion. See e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. and
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Thus, if an attempt to establish a right fails at the federal level,
the right may be pursued in state courts,1"5 legislatures, and administrative agencies. Moreover, lawyers and courts should be
aware that state laws, other than the state constitution, offer many
protections beyond those required by the Federal Constitution.'0 "
12) As a procedural matter, a final decision of a state court is
insulated from review by the United States Supreme Court if the
decision is based on an adequate and independent state ground.107
Insulation results even if the case also decides a federal constitutional issue.108 State court decisions relying on both state and federal grounds have been criticized because the state ground insulates the decision from vertical judicial review by the United States
Supreme Court, and the federal ground insulates the decision from
horizontal political review through amendment to the state
Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925
(1982); Fischer v. Commonwealth Dep't of Pub. Welfare, - Pa. Commw. -, 444 A.2d 774
(1982); Fischer v. Commonwealth Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 497 Pa. 267, 439 A.2d 1172 (1982).
105. State court advocacy may focus on either adjudication or rulemaking. See infra note
184 and accompanying text.
106. Linde, First Things First:Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L.
REv. 379 (1980).
Eager legal aid lawyers once came to our court trying to fit a woman's right
to operate a day care center within the due process analysis of Goldberg v.
Kelly. Only after the argument did our own examination show that she was
entitled to prevail under the state administrative procedure act, which counsel
apparently had not read.
Id. at 390 (footnotes omitted). See also Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 VA. L. Rnv. 1085, 1117-21 (1982).
107. See generally Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv.
750 (1972); Falk, The Supreme Court of California 1971-1972, Foreword,The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALn?. L. REV. 273 (1973); Hill,
The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. Rxv. 943 (1965); Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposalsfor a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REv.
187.
108. Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they
incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory
opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after
we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing
more than an advisory opinion.
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945). See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719
(1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Galie & Galie, State Constitutional
Guarantees and Supreme Court Review: Justice Marshall'sProposalin Oregon v. Hass, 82
DIcK. L. REv. 273 (1978).
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constitution. 0 9

In 1979 in Delaware v. Prouse, 0 the Supreme Court held that a
state court interpretation of its constitution was not an adequate
and independent state ground precluding review if "the state constitutional holding depended upon the state court's view of the
reach of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.""' Since the
adoption of Proposition 1 in California, state constitutional holdings in cases involving busing and pupil assignment apparently will
have to depend on the California court's interpretation of federal
equal protection doctrine." 2
13) Whether a state court should reject a United States Supreme
Court interpretation of a cognate constitutional provision is a difficult question. Until now, most scholars have focused on courts that
have done so. How can courts make this decision and how can
counsel develop meaningful arguments addressing this question?
Should a state court resolve state constitutional issues before it resolves federal issues?" 3 What is the value of a uniform, nationwide
109. Bice, supra note 107, at 757.
110. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
111. Id. at 653. See also City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 4210
(1982); Oregon v. Kennedy, 50 U.S.L.W. 4544 (1982).
112. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's approach to the
adequate state ground doctrine was criticized as "mechanical" in Developments, supra note
5, at 1336 passim.
113. Linde, Without "Due Process".UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125
(1970).
Judicial review of official action under the state constitution thus is logically
prior to review of the effect of the state's total action (including rejection of
the state constitutional claim) under the fourteenth amendment. Claims raised
under the state constitution should always be dealt with and disposed of
before reaching a fourteenth amendment claim of deprivation of due process
or equal protection.
Id. at 135. See also Linde, supra note 106; Linde, Book Review, 52 OR. L. REv. 325, 332-41
(1973). Contra, Kelman, supra note 87, at 429.
By proceeding from a failed federal claim to the question whether the state
constitution grants broader rights in the circumstances of the case, the state
court eliminates an ambiguity that otherwise might shroud its decision. It tells
us distinctly, and obliges the court to think more carefully about, whether and
why the state constitution differs from or retains the same meaning as the federally interpreted counterpart.
Id. See also Developments, supra note 5, at 1357.
When federal protections are extensive and well articulated, state court decisionmaking that eschews consideration of, or reliance on, federal doctrine not
only will often be an inefficient route to an inevitable result, but also will lack
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1 15
rule?11 4 Scholarly writings develop some preliminary guidelines,
but much more thought and study are needed.
V.

INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS

When the interpretation of a state constitution is at issue,
should the courts heed Justice Marshall's admonition: "[Wye must
1 10 Is the
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding"?
17
level?
state
the
interpretation function different at
Questions of state constitutional interpretation depend partly on
the function of the provision at issue. Did the state adopt the provision to overcome a judicial decision, thus constituting a grant of
power? Is the provision, on the other hand, a traditional limitation
on otherwise plenary state power? Judicial interpretation is aided
by remembering that state constitutions reflect an ongoing process
of lawmaking, and each constitutional provision is intended to
the cogency that a reasoned reaction to the federal view could provide, particularly when parallel federal issues have been exhaustively discussed by the Supreme Court and commentators. In a community that perceives the Supreme
Court to be the primary interpreter of constitutional rights, reliance on Supreme Court reasoning can help to legitimate state constitutional decisions
that build on the federal base. When a state court diverges from the federal
view, a reasoned explanation of the divergence may be necessary if the decision
is to command respect.
For state constitutional law to assume a realistic role, state courts must acknowledge the dominance of federal law and focus directly on the gap-filling
potential of state constitutions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
114. See, e.g., State v. Florence, 270 Or. 169, 527 P.2d 1202 (1974) (following United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)). See generally Hancock, supra note 106; Harmon &
Helbush, Robinson at Large in the Fifty States: A Continuationof the State Bill of Rights.
Debate in the Search and Seizure Context, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 1 (1974).
115. See generally Hancock, supra note 106, at 1132-36; Howard, supra note 1, at 934-44
("Finding instances of state courts' use of state constitutions independently of the Federal
Constitution is easier than articulating a principled theory of when courts should in fact use
the power they have to chart their own course."); Sundquist, Construction of the Wisconsin
Constitution -Recurrence to FundamentalPrinciples,62 MARQ. L. REv. 531 (1979); Note,
supra note 74, at 316-19; Comment, The Conflict Between State and Federal Constitutionally Guaranteed Rights: A Problem of the Independent Interpretationof State Constitutions, 32 CASE W. RES. 158 (1981).
116. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). As to federal constitutional interpretation, see Antieu, Constitutional Construction:A Guide to the Principles
and their Application, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 357 (1976).
117. Cooley's ConstitutionalLimitations no longer is the authoritative guide. Swindler,
supra note 14, at 166; Powell, Book Review, 41 HARv. L. Rzv. 272 (1927).
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serve some purpose or to accomplish some goal. Additionally, not
all constitutional provisions are equally specific.1 1 Finally, state
constitutions are interpreted not only by courts, but also by legislators, executive officers, local governments, school district officials,
and lawyers. 9
As a legislative document, s0 a state constitution has an "official,
unvarying text. 1 21 This observation brings to mind Justice Frankfurter's rule for students of statutes: "read the statute; Read the
Statute; READ THE STATUTE. 2 2 The same rule applies to constitutions, and especially to state constitutions where mere reliance
on judicial exposition can be very short-sighted. Significantly, some
state constitutions contain provisions specifically addressing their
2 3
interpretation.
The texts of state constitutions are much more volatile than
their federal counterpart because they are subject to change from a
number of different sources, including legislative proposals, initiative amendments, and proposals submitted to the voters by constitutional conventions. Tracing the "genealogy" of the text under
scrutiny may reveal a number of changes in the language of the
provision. Analyzing the changes leading up to the current text
may support a specific interpretation. Such changes in the under24
lying text rarely are present in federal constitutional law.'
The state constitutional adoption process, by its very nature,
complicates questions surrounding the intent of the framers of
state constitutional provisions, even if the provision was recently
adopted. The people, not the framers, actually enact constitutional
amendments. What impact should this fact have on future judicial

118. Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 304, 370 A.2d 825, 831 (1977) ("Not all constitutional
provisions are of equal majesty."); J. HunST, supra note 32, at 81-83.
119. Horack, supra note 27, at 384; Levinson, InterpretingState ConstitutionsBy Resort
to the Record, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 567, 568 (1978).
120. Horack, supra note 27, at 384.
121. Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation:An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUsIE L.J. 333
(1976).
122. Id. at 338.
123. See, e.g., N.J. CONsT. art. 4, § 7, 11 (liberal construction of municipal powers); S.C.
CONsT. art. I, § 23 (all provisions mandatory and prohibitory).
124. See Sedler, ConstitutionalLaw Casebooks: A View From the Podium, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 1020, 1021 (1981) ("decisions of the United States Supreme Court are the 'stuff' of
constitutional law").
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interpretation of provisions adopted in this manner? In the words
of the New York Court of Appeals:
We may not ... construe the words of the Constitution in exactly the same manner as we would construe the words of a will
or contract drafted by careful lawyers, or even a statute enacted
by the Legislature. It is the approval of the People of the State
which gives force to a provision of the Constitution ... and in
construing the Constitution we seek the meaning which the
words would convey to an intelligent, careful voter. 25
Attempting to ascertain the intent of the people can be difficult
and highly speculative; thus, sometimes "the people's intent is
sought in such materials as newspaper commentaries or summaries
appearing on the ballot."' 2 These notions can appear to lend
credence to the "plain meaning rule" in state constitutional construction: 127 "If the language of the constitutional text is clear on
its face, this plain language is deemed to have been understood by
the people, and their intent is deemed to coincide with that plain
meaning."'' 28 Evaluation of the wisdom of this approach provides
valuable lessons in distinguishing between the objective meaning of
words and the meaning intended by those who use the words.' 21 9
125. Kuhn v. Curran, 294 N.Y. 207, 217, 61 N.E.2d 513, 517-18 (1945). Similar judicial
statements undoubtedly exist in most states. See, e.g., Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 9, 134
A.2d 1, 6 (1957); Commonwealth ex rel. Paulinsli v. Isaac, 483 Pa. 467, 477, 397 A.2d 760,
766 (1979).
126. Levinson, supra note 119, at 569. The California courts exhibit a particular willingness to examine the official voter pamphlets prepared and distributed prior to the vote on
constitutional amendments. See, e.g., City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123,
130-31, 610 P.2d 436, 439-40, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542-43 (1980); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d
757, 775 n.11, 533 P.2d 222, 234 n.11, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106 n.11 (1975); People v.
Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 551, 531 P.2d 1099, 1114, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 330 (1975).
127. "It is a familiar rule of construction that where phraseology is precise and unambiguous there is no room for judicial interpretation or for resort to extrinsic materials. The language speaks for itself, and where found in our State Constitution the language is the voice
of the people." Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 302, 370 A.2d 825, 830 (1977). See also
Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 9, 134 A.2d 1, 6 (1957). The plain meaning rule has been
discredited generally in statutory interpretation. See generally Jones, The Plain Meaning
Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2
(1939); Kernochan, supra note 121; Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "PlainMeaning
Rule," and Statutory Interpretationin the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. RV.
1299 (1975).
128. Levinson, supra note 119, at 569.
129. See, e.g., Chicago & Northwest Ry. Co. v. State, 128 Wis. 553, 587-88, 108 N.W. 557,
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Courts, therefore, should not be content to rely only on indications
of the framers' intent.
Placed in this context, the legislative history of state constitutional provisions is relevant. 130 Records of constitutional convention deliberations131 and legislative debates on proposed constitutional amendments can shed light on the purpose and intent of
state constitutional provisions. Such records, however, may not be
readily accessible. For example, a 1970 Florida decision relied on
constitutional convention records in a "special file in [the] Supreme Court Library. .. ,
State constitutions are much more easily and frequently
amended than is the Federal Constitution. Should the ease and
frequency with which constitutions are amended influence the way
courts interpret them? One commentator contends that "[s]tate
judges, by contrast [to Supreme Court Justices], though they
should not innovate lightly, should recall that state constitutions
are less immutable."1 33 Another commentator argues, however,
561 (1906).
130. See generally, Levinson, supra note 119. But see Lousin, ConstitutionalIntent: The
Illinois Supreme Court's Use of The Record in Interpreting the 1970 Constitution, 8 J.
MAR. J. PAc. & PROC. 189, 191 (1975) ("the record is seldom perfectly clear about anything
more important than the time at which the delegates recessed for lunch - and sometimes
even that point is unclear"); Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66
HARv. L. REV. 28, 42 (1952) ("legislative history itself often needs interpretation").
131. See generally C. BROWNE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, 1776-1959: A BmLIOGRAPHY

(1973); B.

CANNING, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, REVISIONS AND AMEND-

MENrs, 1959-1976: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1977); E. CORNWELL, J. GOODMAN & W. SWANSON, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTrONS: THE POLITICS OF THE REVISION PROCESS IN SEVEN STATES
(1975); B. HALVEY, A SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY ON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (National
Municipal League 2d ed. 1967); S. YARGER, STATE CONSTrTUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, 1959-1975:
A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1976); Bakken, The Arizona Constitutional Convention of 1910, 1978
ARiz. ST. L.J. 1.
132. Hayek v. Lee County, 231 So. 2d 214, 216 n.7 (Fla. 1970). As to the issue of accessibility of legislative history, see United States v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295,

319-21 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); R.
147-54 (1975).

DICKERSON,

THE

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICA-

TION OF STATUTES

133. Howard, supra note 1, at 939. Justice Hennessey of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, concurring in that court's invalidation of capital punishment under the state
constitution, observed that if "the present will of the people of the Commonwealth is that
capital punishment should be permitted... procedures for amendment of the State Constitution which are relatively speedy, but still require time for reasonable reflection, are
available to accomplish that end." Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 242, 275, 339 N.E.2d
676, 694 (1975). But see State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 115-26, 405 A.2d 368, 375-81 (1979)
(Mountain, J., dissenting). Compare People v. Anderson, 8 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100
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that "[s]tate constitutions are easier to amend and may therefore
provide less justification for flexible interpretation." 134 The theoretical and practical ease of amending state constitutions, 135 as well
as the territorial limitation of state constitutional interpretations,
may have profound implications on our attitudes toward the undemocratic process of judicial review and the doctrine of stare decisis. The legal community, heretofore, has not directly faced such
questions although they well deserve the attention of lawyers and
legal scholars.
Several specific interpretation issues highlight the theory of state
constitutions. For example, is the provision under scrutiny self-executing, or must its application await legislative implementation?
The increasing use of the constitution as an alternative vehicle for
lawmaking has resulted in an almost de facto presumption that
provisions are self-executing. A California Supreme Court justice
observed:
Save as to the assurances of individual rights against the government the direct operation of the constitution was upon the government only. ....
Latterly, however, all this has been changed
.... Now the presumption is the reverse. Recently adopted
state constitutions contain extensive codes of law, intended to
operate directly upon the people as statutes do. To say that
these are not self executing may be to refuse to execute the sovereign will of the people. 18'
Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972) (invalidating death penalty under state constitution) with CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 27 (reinstituting capital punishment).
Professor Guido Calabresi recently observed:
The statement by a supreme court of a jurisdiction that a law is unconstitutional is and should be more than an invitation to amend the constitution.
Indeed, the easier the procedure for amendment, the more must the judicial
decrees of unconstitutionality put to the people the seriousness of what an
amendment means. Only in this way can constitutional rights be protected
from temporary majorities. The use of constitutional adjudication when the
object is precisely to see if an old or seemingly anachronistic law still commands popular support cheapens, indeed destroys, the crucial moral force that
underlies and protects true constitutional decisions.
G. CALAREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 12 (1982) (footnote omitted).
134. Levinson, supra note 119, at 568. See also supra note 27.
135. As anyone who has worked with state constitutions knows, they are not "easy" to
amend. But compared with amending the Federal Constitution, amendment of state constitutions is simpler and more often successful.
136. Winchester v. Howard, 136 Cal. 432, 439, 69 P. 77, 78-79 (1902); Note, Some Ten-
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The courts have developed a general test for determining whether
a state constitutional provision is self-executing. The test focuses
on whether the provision in question is capable of application or
enforcement in the absence of implementing legislation. 137 Presumably this refers to judicial application or enforcement. Of course,
when constitutional change is substituted for legislation, questions
will arise concerning the relationship of the constitutional change
to statutory law and legislative authority on the same subject." 8
Questions also arise in state constitutional interpretation as to
whether provisions are mandatory or directory.13 9 Other issues surround the application of maxims of interpretation.1 40 Finally,
under certain circumstances, courts will defer to legislative interpretation, as reflected in statutes, of constitutional provisions.4 1
For example, in Jasper v. Mease Manor, Inc.,1 42 the Florida Su-

dencies in ConstitutionMaking, 2 CALIF. L. REV. 203, 210 (1914). See also People v. Carroll,
3 N.Y.2d 686, 690-91, 148 N.E.2d 875, 877, 171 N.Y.S.2d 812, 816-17 (1958) and authorities
cited therein.
137. The test is whether the provision "supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the
right which it grants may be enjoyed and protected ... without the aid of a legislative
enactment." State ex rel. City of Fulton v. Smith, 355 Mo. 27, 32-33, 194 S.W.2d 302, 304
(1946) quoting 11 AM. Jur. Constitutional Law § 74, 691-92. For an interesting modern
opinion holding Pennsylvania's environmental provision not to be self-executing, see Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1978).
138. See, e.g., Chesney v. Byram, 15 Cal. 2d 460, 463, 101 P.2d 1106, 1108 (1940) quoting
T. CooLEY, A TREATISE ON CONsTrruloNAL LiMrrATiONS 100 (6th ed. 1890).
However, it does not follow from the determination that the above-mentioned
constitutional provision is self-executing, that the legislature did not have the
power to enact legislation providing reasonable regulation for the exercise of
the right. . . "but all such legislation must be subordinate to the constitutional provision, and in furtherance of its purpose, and must not in any particular attempt to narrow or embarrass it."
Id.
139. Compare Arnett v. Sullivan, 279 Ky. 720, 13 S.W.2d 76 (1939) (distinguishing statutory and constitutional interpretation, and holding that constitutional provisions are always
mandatory) with Armstrong v. King, 281 Pa. 207, 126 A. 263 (1924) (all that is said in the
state constitution is not of the same mandatory force). See generally GRAD, THE DRAFING
OF STATE CONSTIunrONS: WORKING PAPERS FOR A MANUAL, 11-2 through II-15 (National Municipal League, 1967).
140. See, e.g., Eberle v. Nielson, 306 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Idaho 1957) (rejecting expressio
unius est exclusio alterius for state constitutional interpretation).
141. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 222.19(1) (1977). "It is the declared intention of the Legislature that the purpose of the constitutional exemption of the homestead is to shelter the
family and the surviving spouse ... "Id.
142. 208 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1968).
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preme Court retreated from its prior judicial definitions of charitable tax exemptions authorized in the constitution and deferred to a
legislative definition." 3
Overall perspectives on approaches to interpreting state constitutional provisions, such as those briefly discussed above, can significantly benefit lawyers, courts, and legal scholars faced with constitutional interpretation problems.

VI.

THE STATE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

A. Limitations on Legislative Power
A commentator observed that "one of the most marked features
of all recent State constitutions is the distrust shown of the legislature." 1" The transition from early state constitutions granting unfettered legislative power to the more recent constitutions restricting legislative power reflects one of the most important themes in
state constitutional law. 145 This transition is evidenced by two
143. The court in Jasper noted:
The problem therefore differs significantly from that which has been presented
in cases requiring judicial definition of the constitutional concepts in the absence of an explicit statute. Application in those cases of a more limited definition of charitable use, in the primary sense of relief for the indigent or helpless,
does not require or justify rejection of the current statute on constitutional
grounds.
Id. at 825 (footnotes omitted). See Note, Property Tax Exemptions Under Article VII,
Section 3(a) of the FloridaConstitution of 1968, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 641, 649-50 (1969). See
also Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State ex rel. Boone, 234 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1970);
Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903, 906 (Fla. 1969); Ammerman v. Markham, 222 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1969).
144. Eaton, Recent State Constitutions, 6 HARv. L. REv. 109 (1892). See also J. HuRST,
supra note 32, at 5-10; G. WOOD, supra note 10, at 403 passim.
Chief Justice Warren in 1964 observed:
State legislatures are, historically, the fountainhead of representative government in this country. A number of them have their roots in colonial times,
and substantially antedate the creation of our Nation and our Federal Government. In fact, the first formal stirrings of American political independence are
to be found, in large part, in the views and actions of several of the colonial
legislative bodies.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 564 (1964). For an interesting proposal to restructure a
modern state legislature, see Linde & Frohnmayer, Prescriptionfor the Citizen Legislature:
Cutting the GordianKnot, 56 OR. L. Rv. 1 (1977).
145. One frequently mentioned state constitutional law problem has been the inability of
state legislatures to deal decisively with modern problems due to textual and judicially imposed state constitutional restrictions. See, e.g., Grad, supra note 9, at 939 ('The least we
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characteristics: (1) the insertion of specific "constitutional legislation" into state constitutional texts,146 thereby supplanting legislative prerogatives and sometimes leading to a limitation of legislative alternatives through judicially discovered
"negative
implication;" and (2) the insertion into state constitutions of detailed procedural requirements that the legislature must follow in
14
the enactment of statutory law. 1
1.

Negative Implication

As noted earlier, many state constitutions include provisions
that could be relegated to statutory law. Particularly when these
provisions mandate legislative action or grant authority to a legislature already vested with plenary power, courts can transform
may demand of our state constitutions is that they interpose no obstacle to the necessary
exercise of state powers in response to state residents' real needs and active demands for
service."); Swindler, supra note 1, at 593-96; J. FORDHAM, THE STATE LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTION 26 (1959) ("The only conclusion warranted by the realities of the state constitutional
order is that the legislatures are hamstrung by numerous limitations on their powers.").
Justice Brandeis was referring to state legislatures when he made his famous observation:
"It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single, courageous state may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes referred to "social experiments ... in the
insulated chambers afforded by the several states .
" Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312,
344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
For an interesting study of the extent to which states actually have "experimented," see
Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
880 (1969).
146. "Through distrust of legislatures and the natural love of power, the people have inserted in their constitutions many provisions of a statutory character." McMurray, supra
note 22, at 210. See also supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
147. See generally Williams, State Constitutional Requirements for the Enactment of
Legislation, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 25 (1979).
J. Willard Hurst observed:
The persistent theme of the limitations written into state constitutions after
the 1840's was the desire to curb special privilege. The trend began with general or detailed prohibitions on the enactment of "special" and "local" legislation. The related fear, that special favors would be sought undercover, was expressed in requirements that every bill bear a title clearly stating its subject
matter, and that every bill deal with but one subject. The same fear was behind insistence upon many requirements, hopefully designed to insure full
publicity and open deliberation of the merits of legislation, through three readings, reference to committee, recording the yeas and nays, and the like.
J. HURST, supra note 13, at 241-42.
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these provisions into limitations on legislative power.
It must be emphasized that very nearly everything that may be
included in a state constitution operates as a restriction on the
legislature, for both commands and prohibitions directed to
other branches of the government or even to the individual citizen will operate to invalidate inconsistent legislation.14 8
In constitutional theory state government is a government of
plenary powers, except as limited by the state and federal constitutions . ... In order to give effect to such special authorizations, however, courts have often given them the full effect of
negative implication, relying sometimes on the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius (The expression
of one is the exclusion of another). 14 9

For these reasons, many apparent grants of authority become,
through judicial interpretation, limits on legislative power. Courts
and lawyers should be aware of this hidden dimension of state constitutional language.
2.

ProceduralLimitations on the Enactment of Statutes

Most modern state constitutions contain specific procedural requirements for statutory enactment which were not found in early
state constitutions. Typical procedural limitations include the following: requirements that titles of legislative acts provide general
notice of their contents; 150 prohibition of acts containing more than
one subject;151 limitations on the method of amending existing

148. Grad, supra note 9, at 964-65.
149. Id. at 966 (footnote omitted). But see Eberle v. Nielson, 78 Idaho 572, 306 P.2d 1083
(1957).
150. See generally Sinclair, A ConstitutionalRestraint on Bill Styling, 2 U. NEWARK L.
REv. 35 (1937); Note, The Michigan Title-Body Clause: Necessary Protection or Threat to
Legislation?, 1977 DFr. C.L. REv. 861. Illinois in 1970 removed the title requirement from
its constitution. See Note, State Statutes: The One-Subject Rule Under the 1970 Constitution, 6 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PROc. 359 (1973).

151. See generally Ruud, "No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject," 42 MiNN. L.
Rzv. 389 (1958). The problem of general revisions of the statutes has sometimes been a
difficult one. See generally Dickerson, The Sad Story of Superbill, or What Happened to
the Indiana Code of 1971?, 5 IND. LEGAL F. 250 (1972); Jenks, History of Michigan Constitutional Provision ProhibitingGeneral Revision of the Law, 19 MiCH. L. REv. 615 (1921).
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statutes; 152 limitations on the enactment of special or local laws;153
and limitations on enacting substantive laws through appropria54
tions acts.1
An initial question is whether these types of provisions are judicially enforceable. 55 Some state constitutions address the matter
specifically. For example, the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides: "The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law
when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial
56
determination.'
These procedural requirements for enacting statutes provoke
criticism on a number of grounds, ranging from the assertion that
the requirements "have caused considerable damage through inval5 to the asidation of noncomplying laws on technical grounds,"'M
152. See generally Freund, Supplemental Acts: A Chapter in Constitutional Construction, 8 ILL. L. REv. 507 (1914); Comment, State Statutes: ConstitutionalSubject-Title and
Amendatory Requirements, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1957).
153. See generally Grace v. Howlett, 5 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972); Vreeland v.
Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 370 A.2d 825 (1977); Green, A MalapropianProvision of State Constitutions, 24 WASH. U.L.Q. 359 (1939); Horack, Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone,
12 IND. L.J. 109 (1937); Karasik, Equal Protection of the Law Under the Federal and Illinois Constitutions, 30 DE PAUL L. REv. 263 (1981).
154. See Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1980); Ruud, supra note 151, at 413; 8
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 345 (1980).
155. See generally Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of Constitutions,80 U.
PA. L. REv. 54 (1931); Grant, Judicial Control of Legislative Procedure in California, 1
STAN. L. REV. 428 (1949). Some states rely on the "enrolled bill rule" to exclude evidence of
violation of state constitutional requirements for legislative procedure, except evidence
which is evident on the face of the act itself. See generally Note, Judicial Review of the
Legislative Process of Enactment: An Assessment Following Childers v. Coney, 30 ALA. L.
REv. 495 (1979); Note, Pennsylvania's Enrolled Bill Rule: A Reappraisal in Light of
HB1413 and Velasquez v. Depuy, 75 DicK. L. REv. 123 (1970).
Even in states where these provisions are not enforceable, however, legislatures sometimes
conform. See R. DiCKERSON, LEGSLATIvE DRAFTING 57-59 (1954); Mallison, General Versus
Special Statutes in Ohio, 11 OHio ST. L.J. 462, 499 n.21 (1950).
For a judicial imposition of a certain form of enacting clause in the absence of a constitutional requirement, see Joiner v. State, 223 Ga. 367, 155 S.E.2d 8 (1967).
156. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13. On the other hand, The Model State Constitution's single
subject provision provides: "[L]egislative compliance with this section is a constitutional
responsibility not subject to judicial review." MoDEL STATE CONSTITUTION § 4.14 (1968).
157. Grad, supra note 9, at 963. Conversely, Ruud concluded that the single subject rule's
"benefits are obtained at comparatively little cost in negative results." Ruud, supra note
151, at 452. For other criticism of these procedural requirements, see FORDHAM, supra note
145, at 56; FnuND, supra note 23, at 155-57; Nutting, A Classic Revisited: Standards of
American Legislation, 51 A.B.A.J. 782, 783 (1965); Sinclair, supra note 150, at 62-63.
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sertion "that an argument based on the one subject rule is often
the argument of a desperate advocate who lacks a sufficiently
sound and persuasive one.

' 15 8

Judicial precedents add little cer-

tainty to the application of title and single subject requirements.
"Flagrant violations of this requirement may, of course, be apparent, but no test of violation is laid down by the provision itself and
none has been developed by judicial action.'

59

These provisions,

however, represent an important limit on legislative authority and
illustrate the result of public disillusionment with legislative
abuses. On rare occasions, these procedural provisions may invalidate a statute. More importantly, these provisions make the state
legislative process significantly different from and more rigidly
structured than the federal legislative procedure.
B. Direct Legislation
The initiative and referendum movement around the turn of the
century was another indication of public dissatisfaction with state
legislatures. Initiatives enabled the public to bypass unresponsive
state legislatures, and referendums provided a check on the effect
of unpopular statutes. These devices are more sophisticated than
the earlier procedural restrictions, most of which reflected disapproval of legislative actions. The initiative allowed the people to
take direct action when the legislature refused to act. The referendum enabled the people to target specific enactments rather than
depend on the indirect deterrence of procedural restrictions.
The people of South Dakota began the process of taking back, or
reserving to themselves, a measure of legislative power in a constitutional amendment approved in 1898.60 During the next twenty

years, about a dozen states followed the lead.""' One observer of
that era predicted that "[t]he more direct legislation you have...
158. Ruud, supra note 151, at 447. "To the extent that this argument is considered the
hallmark of a weak case, the advocate may consider it wise to use it very sparingly." Id.
159. Dodd, supra note 27, at 640.
160. Fordham & Leach, The Initiative and Referendum in Ohio, 11 Omo ST. L.J. 495,
496 (1950). See generally Grossman, The Initiativeand Referendum Process: The Michigan
Experience, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 79 (1981).
161. Fordham & Leach, supra note 160, at 496. Idaho's provision was not self-executing
and therefore lay dormant from 1912 until 1933 when it was legislatively implemented. See
Luker v. Curtis, 64 Idaho 703, 136 P.2d 978 (1943).
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Another observer said:

Against the theoretical view of direct legislation little can be
said. If communities were small and intelligent, and newspapers
fair and unprejudiced, direct legislation ought to be a success.
As to whether the great mass of voters in a big commonwealth
will advise themselves sufficiently so as to be able to act intelligently and will so act, is one of the great questions connected
with this form of legislation.16 3
These views raise interesting and complex questions of political
philosophy, especially today when many major public issues are resolved at the ballot box. Also, legal questions arise with regard to
initiated statutes: (1) Can they be amended or repealed by the legislature?16 4 (2) Can such a statute be vetoed by the governor?" 5 (3)
Would the title and single subject limitations apply? 16 (4) How
1 7
should courts interpret such statutes? 6
C.

Legislative Veto
State legislatures, as well as Congress,"" have begun to reassert

162. 6 E. ADAMS,

TRANSACTIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CLUB OF SAN FRANcISco,

292-93

(1911), quoted in Lefcoe & Allison, The Legal Aspects of Proposition13: The Amador Valley Case, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 173 (1979).
163. Platt, Some Experiments in Direct Legislation, 18 YALE L.J. 40, 47-48 (1908).
164. Compare Luker v. Curtis, 64 Idaho 703, 136 P.2d 978 (1943) (legislature had power
to repeal initiated statute) with CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c) (amendment or repeal of initiative statute only with approval of electors unless initiated statute waives approval requirement). See generally Note, Power of the Legislature to Amend or Repeal Direct Legislation, 27 WASH. U.L.Q. 439 (1942); Comment, JudicialReview of Laws Enacted by Popular
Vote, 55 WASH. L. REv. 175 (1979).
165. See State ex rel. Lofgren v. Kramer, 69 Wash. 2d 219, 417 P.2d 837 (1966).
166. See Comment, ConstitutionalRestraints on Initiative and Referendum, 32 VAN. L.
REv. 1143 (1979).
167. See generally Radin, PopularLegislation in California:1936-1945, 35 CALIF. L. Rlv.
171 (1947); Stewart, The Law of InitiativeReferendum in Massachusetts,12 NEw ENG. L.
REv. 455 (1977); Note, Initiative and Referendum - Do They Encourage or ImpairBetter
State Government?, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 925 (1977); Note, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L. Rv. 922 (1975); Note, The Direct Initiative
Process: Have UnconstitutionalMethods of Presenting the Issues PrejudicedIts Future?,
27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 433 (1979).
168. The constitutionality of the legislative veto has been debated at the federal level
since the 1940's. The Supreme Court will decide on the validity of the "one house veto" in
the federal system this term in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 634 F.2d
408 (9th Cir. 1981), argued before the Supreme Court Feb. 22, 1982, 50 U.S.L.W. 3687, 3694
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authority over administrative agencies by the legislative veto. This
mechanism may be either constitutionally or statutorily authorized16 9 and permits the legislature to veto agency rules by taking
steps short of statutory enactment. A leading state case is State v.
A.L.LV.E. Voluntary,7 0 in which the Alaska Supreme Court invalidated that state's veto scheme. This issue requires consideration
of the nature of legislative power and of the relationship between
171
the legislature and the executive.
VII.

THE STATE JUDICIAL BRANCH

State supreme courts serve a number of important functions
within state government and the legal system. Most familiar is
their role in common law development and statutory and constitutional interpretation, functions performed in the context of adjudicating cases. 17 2 Interestingly, state supreme courts developed the
concept of judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes long
before Marbury v. Madison.'1 5 This Article addresses primarily the
interpretation of state constitutions by state supreme courts. A
(Mar. 2, 1982).
169. See generally Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative
Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 79 (1982).
170. 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980). The opinion provides an up-to-date source of the leading
authorities on the subject. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently declared that state's
legislative veto scheme unconstitutional in General Assembly v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 448
A.2d 438 (1982).
171. The legislative veto is said to infringe on the governor's veto power and on the executive's obligation to faithfully execute the laws.
172. Most of the studies of state supreme courts, in both legal and political science literature, focus on adjudicatory policymaking. See generally M. PORTER & G. TARR, STATE SuPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERs IN THE FEDERAIL SYsTEM (1982); Friedman, Kagan, Cartwright
& Wheeler, State Supreme Courts:A Century of Style and Citation,33 STAN. L. REV. 773
(1981); Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, The Business of State Supreme Courts,
1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1977); Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, The
Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REv. 961 (1978); Project, The Effect of
Court Structure on State Supreme Court Opinions: A Re-Examination, 33 STAN. L. REV.
951 (1981); Note, Courting Reversal - The Supervisory Role of State Supreme Courts, 87
YALE L.J. 1191 (1978).
173. See generally Nelson, The Eighteenth Century Background of John Marshall's
ConstitutionalJurisprudence,76 MICH. L. REv. 893 (1978); Nelson, Changing Conceptions
of JudicialReview: The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790-1800, 120
U. PA. L. REv. 1166 (1972); Swindler, Seedtime of an American Judiciary: From Independence to the Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 503 (1976); Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARv. L. Rv. 129 (1893).
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major focus of the study of state constitutional law, however,
should be on the nonadjudicatory functions of state supreme
courts.
A.

Rules of Practiceand Procedure

Supreme courts in many states have constitutional authority to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure for the courts.' 74 Although this power now is explicitly granted in many constitutions,
earlier commentators regarded it as an inherent judicial power.' 7 5
Exercise of the rulemaking power reaches such crucial areas of lawyers' work as discovery and class actions. This grant of power to
the courts serves as a limitation on legislative authority. Therefore,
the procedure-substance dichotomy takes on constitutional dimensions, and statutes that invade the procedural realm may be
invalidated.
The relationship between statutes and court rules varies from
state to state, but common issues arise. For example, in the famous
case of Winberry v. Salisbury,7 6 the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that the New Jersey Constitution 77 prohibited the legislature
from statutorily overriding court rules.' 78 Other states resolve this
issue by reference to the specific constitutional language involved.
For example, Florida's constitution provides: "These rules may be
repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds vote of the member-

174. See generally A. KORBAKES & C. GRAu,JUDIcIAL RULEMAKING IN THE STATE COURTS
- A COMPENDIUM (1978); Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of
JudicialRule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623 (1957); Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and
Separationof Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1975); Means, The Power to Regulate Practice and Procedure in Florida Courts, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 442 (1980).
175. See Pound, The Rulemaking Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926); Wigmore,
All Legislative Rules for JudiciaryProcedureare Void Constitutionally,23 ILL. L. REv. 276
(1928).
176. 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950).
177. The New Jersey Constitution provides: "The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and subject to law, the practice and
procedure in all such courts." N.J. CONsT. art. 6, § 2, 3 (emphasis added).
178. This case sparked a debate in the Harvard Law Review. See Kaplan & Greene, The
Legislature'sRelation to JudicialRule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65
HARv. L. REV. 234 (1951); Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV.
L. REV. 28 (1952). See generally Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial
Rule-Making: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1958).
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ship of each house of the legislature."'17 9

The distinction between practice and procedure is easier to define than to apply. For example, does the following formulation apply to the law of evidence?: "[S]ubstantive law creates, defines,
adopts and regulates rights, while procedural law prescribes the
method of enforcing those rights." 180 When the Florida Legislature
passed a comprehensive statutory evidence code, the Florida Supreme Court resolved the potential conflict by adopting the evidence code as a court rule.181 The Colorado Supreme Court
avoided a possible conflict between its rulemaking authority and a
rape shield statute by holding that the statute would stand because there was no conflicting court rule on the subject."8 2 Taking a
different view of its relationship to the legislature, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has intimated that because it can make substantive
law in common law adjudications, there is no need for the court to
limit itself strictly to practice and procedure in its rulemaking capacity. 8 3 State courts also may use their rulemaking power as an

alternate method to provide individuals with greater rights and
protections than are available under the Federal Constitution.'"
179. FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 2(a). Issues for judicial interpretation still remain. See, e.g.,
Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 808 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977)
(repeal by implication not permitted); In re Clarification of Florida Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1973) (legislature may repeal but not amend rules).
180. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1973).
181. See In re Florida Evidence Code, 376 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1979); In re Florida Evidence
Code, 372 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1979).
182. People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275 (1978). See also Knight v. City of
Margate, 86 N.J. 374, 386-98, 431 A.2d 833, 839-45 (1981) (distinguishing the existence of
judicial rulemaking power from its exercise).
183. Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 307 A.2d 571 (1973).
The constitutional grant of rulemaking power as to practice and procedure is
simply a grant of power; it would be a mistake to find in that grant restrictions
upon judicial techniques for the exercise of that power, and still
a larger mistake to suppose that the grant of that power impliedly deprives the judiciary of
flexibility in the area called "substantive" law.
Id. at 363, 307 A.2d at 577. The difference, of course, between the two "techniques" of
exercising judicial power was that the New Jersey Supreme Court had held that the legislature could not overrule court rules, although the legislature could overrule substantive law
decisions. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
184. See People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 338-39, 217 N.W.2d 22, 27-28 (1974); Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 187-88, 320 A.2d 351, 357-58 (1974) (Pomeroy, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974); Galie, The Pennsylvania Constitution and the Protection of Defendants' Rights 1969-1980: A Survey, 42 U.
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Regulation of the Practice of Law

Another power initially claimed to be inherent in the judiciary
relates to the admission and discipline of attorneys.1 8 5 Many state
constitutions now expressly confer this power upon the courts and,
again, as a grant of judicial authority, this power serves as a limitation on the legislature. Surprisingly, legislatures may not pass statutes concerning the admission and discipline of lawyers. A series of
recent cases in Pennsylvania held that the state ethics act could
not be applied to lawyers."8 ' "Sunset" legislation applying to statutes regulating professions may not regulate the practice of law.
Through the exercise of their power to regulate the bar, courts
have promulgated the modern student practice rules which form
the basis for clinical legal education.18 7 The New Jersey Supreme
Court utilized the power to place limits on attorneys' fees for tort
cases,1 88 and most courts now are grappling with lawyer advertising
and specialization. 8 9 The Florida Supreme Court used the power
to initiate an innovative program that permits lawyers to place
funds entrusted to them in interest-bearing accounts and to use
the revenues for various public service projects.""

Prrr. L. REv. 269, 294 n.175, 310 n.274 (1981); Howard, supra note 1, at 936.
185. See Petition of the Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902, 905-06 (Fla. 1949) and
cases cited therein. See also Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998, 1002 (Me.
1980).
186. See Wajert v. State Ethics Comm'n, 491 Pa. 255, 420 A.2d 439 (1980); Ballou v. State
Ethics Comm'n, 56 Pa. Commw. 240, 424 A.2d 983 (1981); Kremer v. State Ethics Comm'n,
56 Pa. Commw. 160, 424 A.2d 968 (1981) (judges). ContraKnight v. City of Margate, 86 N.J.
374, 431 A.2d 833 (1981). See generally Robertson & Buehler, The Separation of Powers
and the Regulation of the Practice of Law in Oregon, 13 WILLAMWfrE L.J. 273 (1977).
187. See, e.g., art. XVIII, Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, as amended, cited in Attorney General and Others to Amend Article XVIII of the Integration Rule of the Florida Bar,
339 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1976).
188. See American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 66 N.J. 258, 330
A.2d 350 (1974).
189. The Virginia Supreme Court's efforts to regulate lawyer advertising led to its being
sued for first amendment violations. The United States Supreme Court assessed the court's
claimed immunity on the basis of the principles of legislative, rather than judicial, immunity. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S. 719
(1980).
190. See generally In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981); In re
Interest on Trust Accounts, 396 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1981); In re Interest on Trust Accounts,
372 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1979); In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978). The
program is discussed in Berg, A SignificantNew Revenue Source for Legal Services Begins:
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C. Inherent Powers of the Courts
In recent years, particularly with respect to budgetary matters,
state courts have been asserting that
the Judiciary must possess the inherent power to determine and
compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable
and necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities, and its
powers and duties to administer Justice, if it is to be in reality a
co-equal, independent Branch of our Government."
This claim of inherent judicial powers raises important questions
of political theory. "Certainly the political philosophy of 1776 was
based very largely on the notion of social compact and did not recognize the existence of inherent governmental power in either leg2
islative, executive or judicial department. '19
The issue of whether state legislatures exercise delegated or inherent powers is largely academic. Because state constitutions provide that all legislative power resides in the legislature, the important task is to define the legislative power, not to quibble over
whether that power is inherent or delegated. State constitutions
similarly place the judicial power in the judiciary; consequently,
rather than debating whether a court's power is inherent, the inquiry should focus on whether the claimed power is properly a judicial function.
A controversy currently exists in Pennsylvania over the extent to
which statutes granting collective bargaining rights cover state
court employees. An intermediate appeals court recently ruled that
firing a typist employed by a court was a judicial function, and
Interest on Trust Accounts, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1015 (1982); Comment, A Source of
Revenue for the Improvement of Legal Services, Part II, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 113 (1979);
Comment, A Source of Revenue for the Improvement of Legal Services, Part 1, 10 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 539 (1979).
The Internal Revenue Service recently has approved the program in Rev. Rul. 81-209,
1981-2 C.B. 16.
191. Commonwealth ex rel. Caroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 52, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (1971). See
also Comment, State Court Assertion of Power to Determine and Demand its Own Budget,
120 U. PA. L. REv. 1187 (1972). For a more recent example of the Pennsylvania court's
thinking, see Beckert v. Warren, 439 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1981). See generally Hazard, McNamara
& Sentilles, Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1286 (1972); Note, Judicial FinancialAutonomy and Inherent Power, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 975 (1972).
192. Dodd, supra note 22, at 202.
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therefore the courts need not respond to unfair labor practice
charges issued by the state labor board. 193 The court relied on an
earlier Pennsylvania Supreme Court case for the proposition that
"if results of bargaining pose a genuine threat to the judicial function, nothing. . . precludes the judiciary from taking steps reasonably necessary to assure the independence of the judicial

branch. '194 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also said: "[S]o long
as judges retain authority to select, discharge, and supervise court
personnel, the independence of the judiciary remains
unimpaired."' 195 Resolving this question of the employment rights
of nonconfidential court employees, in Pennsylvania and else-

where, 9 ' will add an important chapter to state constitutional law.
D.

Advisory Opinions

Many state constitutions authorize or require state supreme
courts to render advisory opinions to various governmental officials.1 97 States differ, of course, as to which officers may request
opinions and when they may do so. The courts tend to construe
strictly their authority and obligations under these provisions.,,
Interesting questions may arise as to the precedential value of advisory opinions. According to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts:

193. Beckert v. American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, 56 Pa. Commw.
572, 425 A.2d 859 (1981).
194. 425 A.2d at 861 (quoting Ellenbogen v. County of Allegheny, 479 Pa. 429, 438-39, 388
A.2d 730, 735 (1978)).
195. Commonwealth ex rel. Bradley v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 479 Pa. 440,
447, 388 A.2d 736, 739 (1978).
196. See, e.g., In re Michigan Employment Relations Commission's Order, 406 Mich. 647,
281 N.W.2d 299 (1979). See generally Symposium, Unionization and the Courts: Trends
and Prospects, 4 JusT. Sys. J. 265 (1979).
197. In 1931, the Supreme Court of Colorado noted that such a "constitutional provision
is our only authority for answering questions not presented in litigated cases .
"In
re
House Resolution No. 12, 88 Colo. 569, 298 P. 960 (1931).
Advisory opinions that are authorized by state constitutions are different from what Justice Frankfurter was criticizing when he said: "It must be remembered that advisory opinions are not merely advisory opinions. They are ghosts that slay." Frankfurter, A Note on
Advisory Opinions, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1002, 1008 (1924). See also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433, 462 n.4 (1939).
198. See In re House Resolution No. 12, 88 Colo. 569, 298 P. 960 (1931); In re Opinion of
the Justices, 314 Mass. 767, 49 N.E.2d 252 (1943).
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It has been uniformly and many times held that such opinions,
although necessarily the result of judicial examination and deliberation, are advisory in nature, given by the justices as individuals in their capacity as constitutional advisors of the other
departments of government and without the aid of arguments,
are not adjudications by the court, and do not fall within the
doctrine of stare decisis.199
VIII.

THE STATE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Public distrust of the executive branch, as reflected in state constitutions, historically has been inversely related to public distrust
of the legislative branch. The executive branch began in disfavor 20 0
and has gained more power and authority over the years.
A.

ConstitutionalDuties and Agencies

Although the executive branch's main responsibility is usually
thought of as the faithful execution of the laws, state constitutions
directly assign numerous functions to governors and executive
branch officials and agencies. For example, constitutions often assign the power of executive clemency to the governor, thereby in20 2
201
sulating the exercise of that power from legislative or judicial
199. Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 400, 177 N.E. 656, 658 (1931). The court
continued:
When the same questions are raised in litigation, the justices then composing
the court are bound sedulously to guard against any influence flowing from the
previous consideration, to examine the subject anew in the light of arguments
presented by parties without reliance upon the views theretofore expressed,
and to give the case the most painstaking and impartial study and determination that an adequate appreciation of judicial duty can impel.
Id. The New Hampshire Supreme Court "caution[ed] that the opinion given is not a judicial
decision. . . ." In re Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.L 561, 575, 138 A. 284, 291 (1927). The
Florida Constitution provides for "interested persons to be heard on the questions
presented." FLA. CONsT. art. IV, § 1(c).
200. The Americans, in short, made of the gubernatorial magistrate a new kind of
creature, a very pale reflection indeed of his regal ancestor. This change in the
governor's position meant the effectual elimination of the magistracy's major
responsibility for ruling the society-a remarkable and abrupt departure from
the English constitutional tradition.
G. WooD, supra note 10, at 136. See also id. at 132-43.
201. See People v. Herrera, 183 Colo. 155, 516 P.2d 626 (1973); In re Advisory Opinion of
the Governor, 334 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1976); Commonwealth v. Sutley, 474 Pa. 256, 378 A.2d
780 (1977).
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interference.
The people in many states have created executive agencies
through "constitutional legislation." The status of such constitutional agencies or offices in relation to the legislature can be very
different from statutorily created executive agencies or offices. For
example, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated a statute prohibiting hunting on Sundays on the ground that it conflicted with an
administrative rule of the constitutionally established Game and
Fish Commission. The rule provided for a one-month hunting season which included Sundays. 0 3
B.

The Veto Power

Although exercised by the executive, the gubernatorial veto
power has been termed a "legislative power. ' '2 °
[H]istorically what is called the veto-power of American executives is derived from the legislative power of the British Crown.
Until the fifteenth century, statutes in England were enacted by
the king on his own initiative or in response to petitions. From
that time parliament presented bills in place of petitions ....
The king's assent was still necessary; and without his assent a
205
bill was not law.

The opposition to the governor and to the royal veto which
had developed during the colonial period was reflected in the
early state constitutions. These documents made the legislatures
the main authority in state government, and narrowly restricted
the powers of the executive. In the case of the veto power the
doctrine of the separation of powers was probably another factor
in excluding the governor in most states from even a negative
voice in legislation. Only three of the thirteen original states
made any provision in their first state constitutions for a veto on
202. Cf. State of South Dakota v. Brown, 20 Cal. 3d 765, 576 P.2d 473, 144 Cal. Rptr. 758
(1978) (concerning the obligation of a governor, pursuant to art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 of the United
States Constitution, to "deliver up" a prisoner for extradition).
203. Whitehead v. Rogers, 223 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1969). Compare Burns v. Butscher, 187

So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1966) with District School Bd. v. Askew, 278 So. 2d 272, 275 (Fla. 1973)
("constitutional officers").

204. For a case holding a governor's exercise of the veto power to be subject to the rules
of legislative immunity, see Saffioti v. Wilson, 392 F. Supp. 1335 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
205. Fairlie, The Veto Power of the State Governor, 11 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 473 (1917).
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acts of the legislature.

215

206

The governors of all states except North Carolina currently have
the power to veto enactments of the legislature, and the governor
of New Jersey may even exercise a form of pocket veto. 07
The gubernatorial "negative voice" in legislation was even more
broadly expanded with the advent, around the turn of the century,
of the item veto over specific line items in appropriation bills. 08
Some states go beyond the item veto and permit governors to reduce such line items without vetoing them.0 President Reagan recently suggested that the item veto be authorized at the federal
level; 210 thus, the item veto may become a subject of national

debate.
Gubernatorial exercise of the item veto, originally intended to
prevent legislative "logrolling," presents several issues. For example, what constitutes an "item" in an appropriations bill? 11 May a
governor veto language or restrictions without vetoing the appropriation itself? 212 What constitutes an appropriation bill?21
206. Id. at 474-75.
207. The New Jersey governor's pocket veto power was circumscribed significantly by the
adoption of a constitutional amendment at the November 1981 general election.
208. See generally Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive, 31 TEMP. L.Q. 27
(1957); Harrington, The Proprietyof the Negative - The Governor'sPartial Veto Authority, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 865 (1977); Wells, The Item Veto and State Budget Reform, 18 AM.
POL. ScI. REv. 782 (1924).
209. Interestingly, this notion of gubernatorial reduction of appropriation items, as opposed to absolute veto, seems to stem from Pennsylvania's judicial interpretation in Commonwealth v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 48 A. 976 (1901) of its provision to permit such reductions. Virtually all other courts that have considered the issue have rejected this
interpretation. See, e.g., Wood v. State Admin. Bd., 255 Mich. 220, 238 N.W. 16 (1931);
Mills v. Porter, 69 Mont. 325, 222 P. 428 (1924). A number of states, however, have
amended their constitutions to authorize gubernatorial reduction. See generally Note, Item
Veto, Reduction of Items, Elimination of Items Included in a General Sum, 12 S. CAL. L.
REv. 321 (1939).
210. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1981, at L29, col. 1. Not surprisingly, this suggestion came from
a former governor of California, a state where governors may reduce items. The idea is not
new. See, e.g., Riggs, Separationof Powers: CongressionalRiders and the Veto Power, 6 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 735 (1973); Note, The Legislative Rider and the Veto Power, 26 GEo. L.J.
954 (1938); Note, The Item Veto in the American ConstitutionalSystem, 25 GEo. L.J. 106
(1936).
211. See Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1980); State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick,
86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975 (1974); 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 345 (1980).
212. See supra note 211. See also Givens, The Validity of a Separate Veto of Nongermane Riders to Legislation, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 60 (1965); Note, The Legislative Rider and the
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Executive Orders

A recent series of cases concerning ethics and conflicts of interest
addressed the extent of gubernatorial authority to make policy
through executive orders. Several governors promulgated financial
disclosure requirements and conflict of interest guidelines by executive order which, in the absence of legislative authority, were
challenged as beyond the executive power. In the leading case,
Rapp v. Carey,2 14 the New York Court of Appeals invalidated the

order:
The crux of the case is the principle that the Governor has only
those powers delegated to him by the constitution and the statutes ....
Under our system of distribution of power with checks and
balances, the purposes of the executive order 21
however
desirable,
5
may be achieved only through proper means.

Based on the proposition that the executive branch may exercise
only those powers delegated to it by the constitution or statute, the
question of implied powers is often crucial. This consideration may
be contrasted with the importance of implied limitations on the
legislative branch. s 6
IX.

TAXING AND SPENDING

The power of taxation is one of the essential attributes of sovereignty, and is inherent in and necessary to the existence of every
government. In republics it is vested in the legislature, and in
Veto Power, 26 GEo. L.J. 954 (1938).
213. See State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 264 N.W.2d 539 (1978).
214. 44 N.Y.2d 157, 375 N.E.2d 745, 404 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1978).
215. 44 N.Y.2d at 166-67, 375 N.E.2d at 750-51, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 570. See also Buettell v.
Walker, 59 IMI.2d 146, 319 N.E.2d 502 (1974) (purpose of executive order appears to be to
formulate a new legal requirement rather than to execute an existing one); Mazzie v. Commonwealth, 495 Pa. 128, 432 A.2d 985 (1981) (decided on other grounds); Shapp v. Butera,
22 Pa. Commw. 229, 348 A.2d 910 (1975) (governor has only those powers delegated by
constitution or statute, or which may be implied from the nature of the duties imposed
upon him). See generally Martin v. Chandler, 318 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1958); Opinion of the
Justices, 118 N.H. 582, 392 A.2d 125 (1978); Favoriti, Executive Power Under the New Illinois Constitution:Field Revisited, 6 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROc. 235 (1973); Note, Gubernatorial Executive Orders as Devices for Administrative Discretion and Control, 50 IowA L.
REv. 78 (1964).
216. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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the absence of any constitutional restrictions, may be exercised
by them, both as to objects and modes, to any extent which they
may deem proper.21 7
The efforts of state and local governments to raise revenue
through taxation and borrowing, and the expenditure of such
funds, historically were characterized by favoritism, inequality, and
numerous abuses. In what now is a recurring pattern in state constitutional law, many of these inequities or abuses, particularly
those perpetrated by the state and local legislative branch, precipitated the imposition of constitutional limitations on otherwise plenary legislative power. In the field of taxing and spending, such
restrictions are among the most detailed. The following observation about state constitutions is particularly relevant in this area:
We have found our servants dishonest; we won't discharge them
and try to get honest and competent ones. No, we will continue
to employ those who have been proved to be bad, but we will
take good care to tie their hands securely so that they can
218
neither steal nor work.
A.

Taxation

Many state constitutions contain a taxation uniformity clause2 19
requiring all property to be assessed at the same percentage of
value and then taxed at the same rate.2 20 Originally adopted to
eliminate abuses, modern uniformity provisions can stand in the
way of a progressive income tax structure or a flat-rate income tax
2 21
structure with exemptions or deductions for business expenses.
217. Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County, 9 Wis. 378, 387 (1859), quoted in Myers,
Open Space Taxation and State Constitutions,33 VAND. L. Rv. 837, 842 n.35 (1980).
218. McMurray, supra note 22, at 213.
219. See generally W. NEWHOUSE, CONsTITUTIONAL EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN STATE
TAXATION (1959); Matthews, The Function of Constitutional Provisions Requiring Uniformity in Taxation, 33 Ky. L.J. 31 (1949).
The United States Supreme Court criticized these provisions in Nashville, Chattanooga &
St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940): "This Court has previously had occasion to
advert to the narrow and sometimes cramping provision of these state uniformity clauses
." Id. at 368.

220. See generally Note, The Road to Uniformity in Real Estate Taxation: Valuation
and Appeal, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1418 (1976); Note, Inequality in Property Tax Assessments: New Cures for an Old Ill, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1378 (1962).
221. See, e.g., Amidon v. Kane, 444 Pa. 38, 279 A.2d 53 (1971). A proposed amendment to
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Uniformity clauses also necessitate specific constitutional amendments to authorize differential taxation of agricultural land, open
space, or areas of urban redevelopment.2 2 2 Finally, many state constitutions allocate the power to use certain tax sources between
state and local government. 223 For example, most state governments do not have the power to levy a general real property tax
because the state constitution has assigned that authority to local
government. Some state constitutions actually prohibit the use of
certain taxes, such as the personal income tax.2 24 Many states have
committed the subject of tax exemptions to their constitutions. 225
Thus, the legislature may only, or in some cases must, grant ex22
emptions for constitutionally authorized purposes.
State constitutions may hinder attempts to remedy taxation
schemes that violate other provisions of the constitution. In Buse
v. Smith,2 2 7 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that reforms in the
system of funding public schools from property tax revenues violated a constitutional requirement that local taxes be spent in the
the Massachusetts Constitution to permit a graduated income tax was the issue that led to
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
Wisconsin's "circuit breaker" property tax relief program escaped invalidation in State ex
rel. Harvey v. Morgan, 30 Wis. 2d 1, 139 N.W.2d 585 (1966). The court characterized the
program as a social welfare and police power measure rather than as a tax measure.
222. See generally Myers, supra note 217. The author noted:
The rigid uniformity provisions were originally designed to prevent legislative
abuses of the taxing power .

. .

. The open space amendments carve out cer-

tain exceptions to these rules. At the same time, however, the amendments
confirm the continuing viability of the concept of uniformity by allowing specific deviations from operation of the rules.
Id. at 838. See also M. BERHARD, CONSTITUTIONs, TAXATION AND LAND POLICY (1979); Massey
& Silver, Property Tax Incentives for Implementing Soil Conservation Programs Under
Constitutional Taxing Limitations, 59 DENVER L.J. 485 (1982).
223. See generally Antieau, Municipal Power to Tax - Its ConstitutionalLimitations, 8
VAND. L. REv. 698 (1955).
224. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5(a). See generally Armstrong, Constitutional Limitations on Income Taxes in Tennessee, 27 VAND. L. REv. 475 (1974).

225. A recent survey indicates that 43 state constitutions contain property tax exemption
provisions. Ginsberg, The Real Property Tax Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations:A
Perspective, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 291, 292 n.3 (1980). See, Note, Property Tax Exemptions Under
Article VII, Section 3(a) of the FloridaConstitution of 1968, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 641 (1969).
226. For an interesting case in which a court retreated from its view of the requirements
of the constitutional term "charitable" because the legislature disagreed, see Jasper v.
Mease Manor, Inc., 208 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1968), discussed supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
227. 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).

19831

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROCESSES

locality where they are collected.2 28

The role of state constitutions in the state and local tax area is
evidenced by the recent tax revolt. Proposition 13 in California
and its progeny in other states used the mechanism of "constitutional legislation" to limit the amount of state and local taxation.229 This recent movement drew on the old device of constitutionally imposed tax limitations.230
B. Borrowing
Debt limits in state constitutions severely constrain the ability of
state and local government to borrow money, usually through the
sale of bonds, for long-term capital projects.

231

These limits re-

sulted directly from the state government abuses leading to the
"Panic of 1837" and local government abuses contributing to the
1873-1879 and 1893 depressions.232
In this century, the history of government borrowing, which is
necessary to enable state and local government to construct
projects such as buildings, roads, water management systems, and
housing projects, has been a history of evasion of the constitutional
restrictions. Evasion of these restrictions can add significant expense to such borrowing. 23 3 The most recent innovation in this area
228. See generally Comment, State Constitutional Restrictions on School Finance Reform: Buse v. Smith, 90 HARv.L. REV. 158 (1977).
229. See generally Lefcoe & Allison, The Legal Aspects of Proposition 13: The Amador

Valley Case, 53 S.CAL. L. REv. 173 (1979); Rosenberger, HistoricalPerspectiveon Constitutional Limitation of Property Taxes in Michigan, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 939 (1978); Note,
Proposition2 in Massachusetts:Another Proposition13 or a Tax Reform Measure with
Potential Constitutional Problems?, 15 NEW ENG. L. REv. 309 (1980); Note, The Legal
Ramifications of Proposition 13: Protecting State FundamentalRights in Federal Court,
30 SYRACUSE L. REv. 937 (1979).

230. Gelfand, Seeking Local Government Financial Integrity Through Debt Ceilings,
Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The New York City Fiscal Crisis, the Taxpayers' Revolt and Beyond, 63 MINN.L. REv. 545, 551 (1979).
231. See generally Richards v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48, 63-66 (Iowa 1975); Gel-

fand, supra note 230; Virtue, The Public Use of Private Capital: A Discussion of Problems
Related to Municipal Bond Financing,35 VA. L. REv. 285 (1949).

232. See Gelfand, supra note 230, at 546-47; Note, Pennsylvania Constitutional Debt
Limitations - Circumvention and Proposed Reform, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 69 (1963); Comment,
The JudicialDemise of State ConstitutionalDebt Limitations, 56 IowA L. REv. 646 (1971);
Comment, State ConstitutionalProhibitionsAgainst the Lending of State Credit to Municipal Corporations, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 657 (1977).

233. See generally Morris, Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities:
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has been the moral obligation bond.2 4 Also, there has been a great
resurgence in government assistance to private industrial development through the use of industrial development bonds.3 5 The key
to the expansion of bond financing has been the use of revenue
bonds, which require lenders to look to pledged revenues from the
completed projects rather than to the general taxing authority of
the government for repayment of the bonds.
C. Spending
Many state constitutions require a balanced state budget.1 6 The
executive branch estimates anticipated revenues, and the legislature may not appropriate more than that figure.2 3 The executive
branch then may not expend any funds except pursuant to a legislative appropriation.238
X.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

At the time of the Revolution the framers of our state constitutions failed to allocate a basic power in fact acknowledged and
practiced, the power of local government. In 1776 the United
States enjoyed three levels of successful governmental operation
- national, state, and
local. Only the first two were given con2 39
stitutional legitimacy.
The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions,68 YALE L.J. 234 (1958). See also Lawrence,
Constitutional Limitations on Governmental Participation in Downtown Development
Projects, 35 VAND. L. REv. 277 (1982); Quirk & Wein, A Short ConstitutionalHistory of
Entities Commonly Known as Authorities, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 521 (1971).
234. See generally Johnson v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency, 435 Pa. 329, 309 A.2d 528
(1973); Griffith, "Moral Obligation" Bonds: Illusion or Security?, 8 Urn. LAW. 54 (1976).
235. See generally Bell & Hinkle, A Guide to Industrial Revenue Bond Financing, 9
WASHBURN L.J. 372 (1970); Mulcahy & Guszkowski, The Financingof CorporateExpansion
Through Industrial Revenue Bonds, 57 MARQ.L. REv. 201 (1974); Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public IndustrialFinancing:An Historicaland Economic Approach,
111 U. PA. L. REv. 265 (1963).
236. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 7, § l(d); PA. CONST. art. 8, § 13.
237. See supra note 236.
238. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 1(c); PA. CONST. art. 3, § 24. As to the question of state
legislative appropriation of federal funds, see Note, Anderson v. Regan, The Court of Appeals Approves Legislative Appropriation of Federal Funds, 46 ALB. L. REv. 1020 (1982).
239. Herget, The Missing Power of Local Governments: A Divergence Between Text and
Practicein Our Early State Constitutions,62 VA. L. REv. 999, 1001 (1976). "[Although] one
of the principal debates in 1776 centered around implementation of the newly fashionable
idea of separation of powers, the framers gave no thought to separating powers vertically
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The role of local government in state constitutional law evolved
from a position of no constitutional recognition whatsoever and
progressed through the home-rule movement. One commentator
observed:
[T]here is a very important choice between use of the state constitution as the direct instrument for allocating governmental
powers and reliance upon the legislature as a continuing powerdistribution organ in the state. .... The devolution of authority
to local units has traditionally been a function of the state legislature under the strongly prevailing doctrine of legislative
supremacy over local government. It is here that the basic choice
of political method presents great difficulty. What factors militate in favor of modifying
legislative supremacy by constitu240
tional amendment?
Denied constitutional recognition, some local governments initially claimed inherent powers.2 4' The more widely accepted notion, however, was "Dillon's Rule, ' 242 which cast local governments

as creatures of the state legislature. Local government thus consisted of delegated or enumerated powers. 43 Not until the mid(state-local) as well as horizontally (executive-legislative-judicial)." Id. For an interesting
evaluation of the development of city powers, see Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1057 (1980).
240. Fordham, Foreword:Local Government in the Larger Scheme of Things, 8 VAND. L.
REv. 667 (1955).
241. See generally Eaton, The Right to Local Self-Government (pts. 1 and 2), 13 HARv.
L. REv. 441, 570, 638 (1900), 14 HARv. L. Rav. 20, 116 (1901); McBain, The Doctrine of an
Inherent Right to Local Self-Government, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 190, 299 (1916).
242. It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses, and can exercise, the following powers, and no others: First, those
granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation - not simply convenient, but
indispensable.
J. DILLON, 1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55, at 173 (2d ed. 1873), quoted in Herget, supra
note 239, at 1009 n.48.
243. Herget, supra note 239, at 1008-11. This fact, however, raised difficult questions
about delegation of legislative power. Id. In Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540
(1875), Justice Hunt, referring to the relationship between a city and the legislature, stated:
The legislature may give it all the powers such a being is capable of receiving,
making it a miniature State within its locality. Again: it may strip it of every
power, leaving it a corporation in name only; and it may create and recreate
these changes as often as it chooses or it may itself exercise directly within the
locality any or all the powers usually committed to a municipality.
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nineteenth century, partly as a reaction against state legislatures,
did local government begin to obtain recognition in state constitutions.2 44 Such recognition primarily took the form of legislative authorization to delegate power to local government.
The home-rule movement, on the other hand, sought to utilize
the constitution itself as the source of local government powers.2 45
Under these provisions, the local government enacts a charter
which effectively serves as a constitution for the local government.
The constitution itself delegates exclusive authority over municipal
affairs.2 46 Under this scheme, the home-rule charter serves as a
grant of power to the local government. The most recent home-rule
recommendations, however, suggest "a direct constitutional devolution of substantive home rule powers dependent only upon the
adoption of a home rule charter. It does not place any substantive
power or function beyond legislative control by general law. Under
this approach a home
rule charter is an instrument of limitation
2' 4 7
and not of grant.
Other issues and concepts of local government relevant to state
constitutional law include special purpose local governments such
as school districts and special districts, a comparison of city and
county 248 governments and their powers, and regional gov-

Id. at 544.
244. Herget, supra note 239, at 1011-13. The problem of "negative implication" immediately arose from these provisions.
245. See generally Kratovil & Ziegweid, Illinois Municipal Home Rule and Urban Land
- A Test Run of the New Constitution, 22 DE PAuL L. REV. 359 (1972); Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York (pts. 1 & 2) 54 COLUM. L. REV. 311 (1954), 55 COLUM.
L. REV. 598 (1955); Walker, Toward a New Theory of Municipal Home Rule, 50 Nw. U.L.
REV. 571 (1955).
246. Dean Fordham criticized this "state concerns-local affairs dichotomy" because of its
"assumption that governmental powers and functions are inherently either general or local
in character." Fordham, supra note 240, at 674-75. See generally Sato, "MunicipalAffairs"
in California,60 CALiF. L. REv. 1055 (1975).
247. Fordham, JudicialNullification of a Democratic PoliticalProcess- The Rizzo Recall Case, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 13 (1977). The recommendations are contained in Fordham,
Model ConstitutionalProvisions for Municipal Home Rule (1953), reprinted in J. FORDHAM, LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW 76-84 (rev. ed. 1975). See generally Vanlandingham, Constitutional Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA (NLC) Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1
(1975).
248. See generally Etter, County Home Rule in Oregon, 46 OR. L. REV. 251 (1967);
Kneier, The Legal Nature and Status of the American County, 14 MINN. L. REV. 141
(1930); Lowrie, Interpretationof the County Home Rule Amendment by the Ohio Supreme
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ernment.24 e
XI.

PUBLIC EDUCATION

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that there is no federal right to education. 5 0 Many state constitutions, however, provide a specific right to a "thorough and efficient" or a "uniform"
education.2 1 These provisions may or may not be judicially enforceable.2 5 2 The most familiar role of these provisions is in the

school finance decisions of the 1970's beginning with the New
23
Jersey decision in Robinson v. Cahill.
Beyond school finance, however, state constitutional provisions
relating to public education can affect such issues as the educaCourt, 10 U. Cn4. L. REv. 454 (1936).
249. See Rose, Conflict Between Regionalism and Home Rule: The Ambivalence of Recent Planning Law Decisions, 31 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1978); Note, Intergovernmental Cooperation: Does the 1970 Illinois Constitution Give Units of Local Government the Green
Light?, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 295 (1975). See also Grad, supra note 9, at 960
("enumerations of city home rule powers are apt to get in the way of metropolitan regional
development ... because home rule municipalities can exercise an effective veto over measures leading to metropolitan combinations").
250. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
251. See generally Moore, In Aid of Public Education: An Analysis of the Education
Article of the Virginia Constitution of 1971, 5 U. RICH. L. REv. 263 (1971).
252. Compare Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
(1973) (local taxation plan found violative of constitutional provision imposing upon state
the duty to provide thorough and efficient public education) with Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa.
414, 399 A.2d 360 (1979) (statutory school funding system consistent with similar constitutional provision). As to the role of these constitutional provisions during desegregation in
the South, compare Garrett v. Faubus, 230 Ark. 445, 323 S.W.2d 877 (1959) (state constitution's guarantee of free public schools does not prohibit closing of schools) with Harrison v.
Day, 200 Va. 439, 106 S.E.2d 636 (1959) (school closing prohibited by state constitutional
provision requiring efficient system of free public schools).
253. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). See generally Johnson,
State Court Intervention in School Finance Reform, 28 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 325 (1979);
Tractenberg, Reforming School Finance Through State Constitutions: Robinson v. Cahill
Points the Way, 27 RuTmER L. REV. 365 (1974); Comment, A "Uniform" Education: Reform of Local Property Tax School Finance Systems Through State Constitutions, 62
MARQ. L. REV. 565 (1979).
For an economic analysis of these cases, see Inman & Rubinfield, The JudicialPursuit of
Local Fiscal Equity, 92 HRV. L. REv. 1662 (1979); Note, Equalization of Municipal Services: The Economics of Serrano and Shaw, 82 YALE L.J. 89 (1972); Note, A Statistical
Analysis of the School FinanceDecisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YArE
L.J. 1303 (1972).
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tional rights of the mentally handicapped,2 5 4 the right to bilingual
education,2 55 and the right to sound educational facilities.2 5 Also,
with reference to, higher education, state constitutions often contain specific provisions relating to matters such as independent
university governance. 251
XII.

AMENDMENT AND REVISION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

State constitutional law reflects a process of lawmaking, both
through judicial interpretation and through changes in the consti-

tutional text. As noted earlier, such changes add a dimension- not
present in federal constitutional law. Once this distinction is realized, studying and understanding the processes of constitutional
change assumes obvious importance.2 58 Ignoring these processes is

254. See generally State v. Stecher, 35 Conn. Supp. 501, 390 A.2d 408 (1977); Levine v.
State Dep't of Inst. and Agencies, 84 N.J. 234, 418 A.2d 229 (1980). The 1958 Illinois decision, Department of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 15 Il1. 2d 204, 154 N.E.2d 265 (1958), was "overruled" by article X, § 1 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 ("A fundamental goal of the
People of the State is the educational development of all persons to the limits of their
capacities.").
255. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. XII, §§ 8, 10; Comment, Education and the SpanishSpeaking - An Attorney General'sOpinion on Article XII, Section 8 of the New Mexico
Constitution, 3 N.M.L. REV. 364 (1973).
256. See In re Application of Freehold Bd. of Educ., 86 N.J. 265, 430 A.2d 905 (1981);
Guard & LaMaita, FinancingPublic EducationalFacilitiesin New Jersey, After the Freehold Decision, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 195 (1982).
257. See generally Alabama Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 374 So. 2d 258, 260 (Ala.
1979); H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW 57-59 (1979); Beckham,
Constitutionally Autonomous Higher Education Governance: A Proposed Amendment to
the Florida Constitution, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 543 (1978); Beckham, Reasonable Independence for Public Higher Education: Legal Implications of Constitutionally Autonomous
Status, 7 J. LAW & EDUC. 177 (1978); Horowitz, The Autonomy of the University of California Under the State Constitution, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 23 (1977).
258. See generally W. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTrrUTIONS

(1910); W. GRAVEs, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (1960); Howard, ConstitutionalRevision: Virginia and the Nation, 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1974); Sturm, The Procedureof'State
Constitutional Change - With Special Emphasis on the South and Florida, 5 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 569 (1977); White, Amendment and Revision of State Constitutions, 100 U. PA.
L. Rav. 1132 (1952).
For some excellent studies of the process of constitutional development, revision, and ratification, see E. CORNWELL, JR., J. GOODMAN & W. SWANSON, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-

TIONS: THE POLrICS OF THE REVISION PROCESS IN SEVEN STATES (1975); F. GREEN, CONSTrruTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES, 1776-1860 (1930); R. PETERS, JR., THE
MA SACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1780: A SoCIAL COMPACT (1978); M. PETERSON, DEMOCRACY,
LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY: THE STATE CONSrrrtUONAL CONVENTIONS OF THE 1820's (1966).
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comparable to considering only judicial interpretation of statutes
without considering the possibility of statutory amendment. As
previously discussed, many important issues are resolved in the
context of proposed constitutional amendments.
Many early state constitutions contained no amendment provisions, and others specifically forbade certain amendments. For example, the Alabama Constitution of 1901 provided that
"[r]epresentation in the legislature shall be based upon population
and such basis of representation shall not be changed by Constitutional amendment.

'259

Could the legislature propose an amend-

ment eliminating that sentence? In 1955 the Alabama Supreme
Court, in an advisory opinion, held:
Surely it is self evident that with the ultimate sovereignty residing in the people, they can legally and lawfully remove any
provision from the Constitution which they previously put in or
ratified, even to the extent of amending or repealing one of the
sections comprising our Declaration of Rights, even though it is
provided that they "shall forever remain inviolate."2 60
Thus, the people of a state apparently cannot bind themselves in
the constitution as to the substance of constitutional amendments.
May the constitution, however, bind the people as to the procedure
for constitutional amendment? In many states, the requirement
that a proposed amendment receive a majority of all persons voting in the election, rather than just on the amendment, frustrated
constitutional change."" This requirement frustrated change because "political experience shows that there is a consistently
smaller proportion of the total vote in a general election cast for
2
constitutional proposals than for live candidates for office.

'26

State constitutions contain various technical requirements, such
259. ALA. CONST. art. XVHI, § 284 (1901).
260. Opinion of the Justices, 263 Ala. 158, 161, 81 So. 2d 881, 883 (1955). See also Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1966). Difficulty of amendment was one factor
which Congress considered in a constitution when admitting new states. See State ex rel.
Witt v. State Canvassing Bd., 78 N.M. 682, 437 P.2d 143 (1968).
261. See Laughlin, A Study in ConstitutionalRigidity (pt. 1), 10 U. CHi. L. REv. 142
(1943); Sears & Laughlin, A Study in ConstitutionalRigidity (pt. 2), 11 U. CHi. L. REv.374
(1944).
262. Swindler, supra note 1, at 596.
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as title and single subject requirements,6 3 similar to those for the
enactment of statutes. Also, different mechanisms may be available
for amendments than for revisions. 6 4
Finally, most states permit the legislature, by an extraordinary
majority, to propose amendments for ratification by the people.26 5
Some states permit initiatives to propose amendments. 26 The legislature or, possibly, the people can call constitutional conven28
tions.267 Is a limited convention permissible at the state level?

263. See People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979);
Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208,
228-235, 583 P.2d 1281, 1289-93, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 247-51 (1978). California's recently
adopted criminal justice initiative, Proposition 8, was upheld against procedural attacks.
Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982). See also Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 641 P.2d 200, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1982) (pre-election decision
permitting Proposition 8 to be placed on ballot). Procedural defects, however, may not always be subject to judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Roeschlein v. Thomas, 273 N.E.2d 554 (Ind.
App. 1971); Note, Validity of a Proposed ConstitutionalAmendment Under the One-Alteration Rule, 45 MINN. L. REV. 291 (1960).
264. In Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978), the Supreme Court of California
stated: "although the voters may accomplish an amendment by the initiative process, a constitutional revision may be adopted only after the convening of a constitutional convention
and popular ratification or by legislative submission to the people." Id. at 221, 583 P.2d at
1284, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 242. Compare Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1970) (initiative
petition to amend section of constitution held improper where it would affect other sections)
with Weber v. Smathers, 338 So. 2d 819, 822-23 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring) (discussing the amendment broadening the initiative provision in response to the earlier Adams
decision). See generally Moore v. Brown, 350 Mo. 256, 165 S.W.2d 657 (1942); Note, Legislative Efforts to Amend the FloridaConstitution: The Implications of Smathers v. Smith, 5
FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 747 (1977).
265. But see DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (constitutional amendment by two successive legislatures without vote of the people). In Wass v. Anderson, 312 Minn. 394, 252 N.W.2d 131
(1977), the court held that an act of the legislature did not violate the single subject rule
because it contained a proposed constitutional amendment in addition to germane statutory
provisions.
266. Proposition 13 in California is the best known recent state constitutional amendment
adopted through use of the initiative. It is a technique, however, that is gaining momentum
in a number of states. See generally supra note 264.
267. See Dodd, State Constitutional Conventions and State Legislative Power, 2 VAND.
L. Rev. 27 (1948); Note, supra note 27; Comment, Convening a ConstitutionalConvention
in Washington Through the Use of the PopularInitiative, 45 WASH. L. Rev. 535 (1970).
268. See Snow v. City of Memphis, 527 S.W.2d 55 (Tenn. 1975); Gooch, The Recent Limited Constitutional Convention in Virginia, 31 VA. L. Rev. 708 (1945); Sturm, supra note
258, at 583; White, Amendment and Revision of State Constitutions, 100 U. PA. L. Rev.
1132, 1134-35, 1142 (1952); Note, Limited Federal Constitutional Conventions: Implications of the State Experience, 11 HARv. J. oN LEGIS. 127 (1973); Note, ConstitutionalRevi-
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Florida's constitution of 1968 provides for a unique Constitution
Revision Commission 26 9 which met in 1977-1978270 and is to meet
every twenty years thereafter. The Commission's recommended
constitutional changes go directly on the ballot to be voted on by
the people. The people, however, rejected the recommendations of
the 1977-1978 Commission.2 7 1
XIII.

CONCLUSION

As illustrated throughout this Article, state constitutional law
encompasses much more than just another level of civil liberties
protection. State constitutions are strikingly similar to one another
in their language and, more importantly, in the legal and governmental issues that they affect. The practical and theoretical issues
discussed in this Article could arise in any state and therefore
272
should no longer be considered of narrow, provincial interest.
The subject of state constitutional law demands the best legal
thinking because "what state courts produce is at least partially a
function of what commentators and litigants expect them to pro-

sion by a Restricted Convention, 35 MINN. L. REV. 283 (1951).
269. See UhIfelder, The Machinery of Revision, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv.575 (1978). See also
Nunn, The Commission Route to Constitutional Reform: The Arkansas Experience, 22
ARK.L. REV. 317 (1968).

270. For the recommendations of the 1978 Commission, see Symposium on the Proposed
Revisions to the Florida Constitution,'6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 565 (1978).
271. This is one of several major unsuccessful attempts at state constitutional revision in
recent years. See J. WHEELER, JR.& M. KINSEY, MAGNIFICENT FAILURE: THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967-1968 (1970); McKay, ConstitutionalRevision in New York
State: Disaster in 1967, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 207 (1967); Pullen, Why the Proposed Mary-

land Constitution Was Not Approved, 10 WM.& MARY L. REV. 378 (1968); Swindler, supra
note 1, at 590-93.

272. The New York Times recently reported:
The problem, state constitutionalists argue, begins with the elitism of legal
education and educators. In American law schools, particularly the most prestigious and status-conscious, the study of state law is considered parochial. Of
even more vital interest to professors anxious to make a name for themselves,
national reputations have generally been thought to come only by studying
"national law."
Margolick, State JudiciariesAre Shaping Law That Goes Beyond Supreme Court, N.Y.
Times, May 19, 1982, at A2, col. 1. See also Collins, The Move to Free State Courts from
the 'Potomac'sEbb & Flow, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 20, 1982, at 22, col. 2. But see Y. KAMIsAR, W.
LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6 (5th

ed. Supp. 1982) (recognizing state court activism in criminal procedure area).
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duce." 'll The bar, the bench, and legal scholars must give state
constitutional law, both comparative and state specific,

tention it

merits." 5

27 4

the at-

273. Project Report Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 7 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 271, 320 (1973).

274. Studies of how individual states approach, for instance, their declaration of rights
can provide valuable insights to students, courts, and the practicing bar. Galie, The Pennsylvania Constitution and the Protection of Defendants' Rights, 1969-1980: A Survey, 42
U. Prrr. L. REv. 269, 270 (1981); Rees, State Constitutional Law for Maryland Lawyers:
JudicialRelief for Violations of Rights, 10 U. BALT. L. REv. 102 (1980); Rees, State Constitutional Law for Maryland Lawyers: Individual Civil Rights, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 299 (1978);
Vitiello, Independent and Adequate State Grounds: A Stone Unturned by Louisiana's
Criminal Defense Bar?, 25 LOYOLA L. REv. 745 (1979); Willner, ConstitutionalInterpretation in a Pioneerand Populist State, 17 WLmz='rr L.J. 757 (1981); Comment, Tennessee
Judicial Activism: Renaissance of Federalism, 49 TENN. L. REV. 135 (1981). The state supreme courts will be faced with questions of whether to "follow" Supreme Court opinions,
thus presenting an important audience for academic commentators.
275. Dean Fordham recently observed: "Another aspect of constitutional law to be noted
is the slighting of state constitutional law in legal education ... . [S]tate constitutional law
is both a substantial component of the constitutional system and something of very real
professional significance to lawyers." Fordham, Some Observations Upon Uneasy American
Federalism, 58 N.C.L. Rav. 289, 293 (1980). See also Swindler, supra note 14, at 166 ("the
chronically neglected subject of state constitutional law").
In 1917 Ernst Freund complained of "the attitude of indifference and neglect revealed in
the teaching and writing of law toward the positive content of American state constitutions
*
No adequate systematic account of the development of state constitutions with reference to their place in our public law is to be found in any constitutional treatise." E.
FREUND, supra note 23, at 144-45.
The gap in legal education noted by Dean Fordham has been acknowledged by judges as
well as by legal educators. Justice Charles G. Douglas of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire observed: "The fact that law clerks working for state judges have only been taught or
are familiar with federal cases brings a federal bias to the various states as they fan out
after graduation from 'federally' oriented law schools." Douglas, State JudicialActivism The New Role for State Bills of Rights, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1123, 1147 (1978). Justice
Douglas deplored the "lack of... textbooks developing the rich diversity of state constitutional law." Id. Justice Hans A. Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court observed:
[T]he law schools have nationalized legal education, and constitutional law
books deal exclusively with the opinions of the United States Supreme Court.
Perhaps, if we could develop more constitutional law courses that are built
around the issues and the choices which exist throughout our fifty-one constitutions and that would treat the opinions of judges as historic but not infallible
struggles with those issues and choices, then more new lawyers could live up to
Judge Levine's admonition to the new lawyers admitted to the Maryland Bar
to give their attention to the Maryland Constitution.
Linde, supra note 106, at 392-93. See also Faville, Dissecting a Constitution, 13 WAYNE L.
Rav. 549 (1967) (calling for required course in state constitutional law); Mazor, Notes on a
Bill of Rights in a State Constitution,1966 UTAH L. REv. 326, 328 (1966) (no treatise exists
on state constitutional law, nor one on the subject of civil liberties under state constitutions); Welsh & Collins, supra note 100, at 39-43.

